Bava Basra 143

Rabbi Meir’s Text

The Torah says that “all the souls of the House of Yaakov coming to Egypt were 70” (Bereishis 46:27), but the Midrash says that if we count them, we find only 69 (Bereishis Rabah, 94:9). The Torah, though, reckons 70 because Yocheved was born at the gates of Egypt, and by the time the Israelites passed through the walls, they numbered 70. Alternatively, Chushim is counted as two since he would eventually beget many offspring, as the Torah says: “…the sons of Dan: Chushim” (see Tosfos, s.v. Shehayu). Still, the Midrash adds that Rabbi Meir had a sefer Torah whose text read “the son of Dan: Chushim”; this statement is altogether perplexing.

According to the commentary Avnei Shoham (on Bereishis 46:23), the above two explanations depend on the difference of opinions as to if a fetus is regarded as a limb of its mother, or is the unborn child a separate entity. If like the latter, we can count Yocheved separately and include her in the total of 70. If a fetus is a part of its mother’s body, we cannot count Yocheved and must rather count Chushim as two. Rabbi Meir holds that a fetus is not part of its mother’s body. He therefore reckoned Yocheved as an individual, though she had not yet been born as they approached Egypt, and his sefer Torah said “the son of Dan…,” counting Chushim as only one.

Is a Disqualified Esrog always Inferior?

by: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

The owner of an esrog orchard separated the required terumah and tithes, including ma’aser rishon which he gave to a Levite. The latter was glad to get such a large amount of esrogim and thought he would find at least one of them to be a choice specimen for the mitzvah of arba’ah minim. After a thorough search, however, he discovered that all the fruit were unfit for the mitzvah and he came to the owner of the orchard in resentment. “You took great care to separate ma’aser rishon,” he asserted, “but you separated inferior fruit from the superior – esrogim unfit for their mitzvah as ma’aser for those kosher for their mitzvah – and the Gemora says that someone who uses bad fruit to separate the required gifts for good fruit is a sinner.” The owner of the orchard asked Rav Yitzchak Silberstein to decide the question and the latter referred him to his brother-in-law HaGaon Rav Chayim Kanievski. Rav Kanievski ruled that the ma’aser had been properly separated as “good” and “bad” refer only to the fruit’s edibility. In that sense one should prefer using a big, ripe esrog for tithing rather than an esrog considered choice for its mitzvah, even if the former is disqualified for the mitzvah of arba’ah minim.

HALACHOS FROM THE DAF

"My Dear Sons" - Who is Included?

By: Reb Avraham Klein

A father of five is overseas on a business trip, and decides to send his children a present. He shops around for a nice gift for his beloved children, and sends it off with UPS. The next day his children receive the package, tear off the wrapping paper, and out comes a note from their father. “My dear sons, just a little present from Daddy. I miss you tons! Love, Daddy.” The children are nonplussed. “Sons”? asked Rachel. “We only have one brother.” The four sisters as one stare at Chaim. “What is the meaning of this, Chaim?” they ask the bewildered young man.

We learned that when a father calls his children - sons, he means to include his daughters as well. That doesn’t mean that the four sisters in the above story will automatically get their present. First we have to analyze a number of factors. a) The type of gift. b) Are the children married? The son? The daughters? c) What would be the halachah if the father didn’t write sons, rather just wrote, “A present from Daddy” without specifying any of his children? d) What would the halachah have to say in the same exact story, but with one difference? Instead of on an overseas trip, the father is deathly ill!?

A) The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat Siman 247 Seif 1) rules that both the sons and daughters receive the gift, only when the presents clearly indicate that some are for boys (walkie talkie) and some are for girls (dollhouse). However, if it can be used by both the sons and daughters (for example, money), then, only the son would get it. The rationale (as explained by the Kessef Mishnah and Aruch Hashulchan) is that the father does normally refer to his daughters by calling them “my sons,” and therefore, she receives a gift too when it is obviously meant for her. But if the present can be for both, logic dictates that “sons” means sons - even if there is only one son.

B) All of this is true whether the sons and daughters are both not married, only the sons are married or only the daughters are married (S’ma). There is a dispute in a case where they are both married. S’ma rules that the daughters-in-law receive the gift, but not the daughters. K’tzos cites the Bach that the daughters are the ones that receive the gift, and not the daughters-in-law.

C) In a case where the father didn’t specify “sons,” the Mechaber records two opinions. 1) If it’s a type of gift that is clearly meant for his daughters, then they receive it, and if they are married, then the daughters in law get it. This is true even according to the Bach, because the daughters-in-law are part of his household. 2) If the father has a wife, then she is the one that receives the gift, and not the daughters. But in the above case where the father wrote “sons,” she is obviously not included.

D) Regarding a deathly ill person that wrote “my sons,” his daughters are not included, even if the present is clearly for them. The reason is, that when it comes to a deathly ill person, he is essentially dividing his inheritance, and there we assume his language is following the Torah’s directive that the daughters do not inherit when there is a son.

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Kinyan Peiros on the Esrog

Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda expounded: If one said to another, “This esrog is given to you as a gift, and after you (his death) it shall be given to So-and-so,” and the first recipient took it and fulfilled his obligation with it, this will be a point of dispute between Rebbe and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (for according to Rebbe, who maintains that the one who has the rights to the produce is not regarded as the owner of the object, he will not have discharged his obligation, for the esrog is not his; according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, it is regarded as his, and he will have fulfilled his obligation).

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak asked him: The dispute between Rebbe and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is only if the acquisition of the produce is like the acquisition of the capital or not, but here, if the first recipient cannot discharge his obligation with it, for what other purpose was the esrog given to him! Rather, it is clear that everyone holds that the first recipient may properly discharge his obligation with it; the argument would be regarding a case where he sold it or ate it.

The Mefarshim ask: According to Rebbe, who holds that the one who has the rights to the produce is not regarded as the owner of the object, how can the first recipient discharge his obligation with this esrog? It is not regarded as “lachem” – completely his, so what difference does it make that the donor intended for him to fulfill his mitzvah?

The Ritva explains that since the donor’s intention is that the first recipient should discharge his obligation with it, it must be that he gave him the guf (capital) and the peiros (the produce) completely; however, he stipulated that he, after he has discharged his obligation with it, must give it over completely to the second person. This would be similar to a gift that was given on condition that it is returned to him.

Reb Shmuel Rozovsky explains as follows: It is evident from the Gemora above (136b) that even according to Rebbe, it is possible to give someone rights to the produce that will be regarded as an acquisition of the guf. For the Gemora said that a father, who retains the rights to the produce in a case when he gave away the land to his son, since it affects him personally, he made sure to keep certain rights to the land along with the produce. So too in this case, it is evident that the donor intends to give the guf of the esrog along with the peiros; accordingly, the recipient can discharge his obligation with it.

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Replacing the Lost Esrog

By: Rabbi Mendel Weinbach
Ohr Sameach

A Jew borrows a very expensive esrog from his neighbor to fulfill the mitzvah of taking the four species on Sukkos. Before he has a chance to return it, it somehow gets lost and he must now compensate the owner with another esrog. But why should he be required to purchase a similarly expensive esrog if he can provide him with a perfectly kosher one that is not of the same quality but much cheaper?

This question was dealt with by two great halachic authorities in connection with our Gemora (Bava Kamma 78) . The Sage Rava rules that if someone set aside an ox for fulfillment of his vow and that ox was stolen, the thief can replace it with a sheep and the victim cannot demand an ox because he wished to bring a sacrifice of greater quality. One opinion is that the case of the esrog is similar to this case and the ruling should be the same. A dissenting opinion is found, however, in the Responsa of Chacham Tzvi (Responsa 102). In the case of our Gemora, he points out, the thief did not cause his victim any loss of money, while he did so in the case of the esrog. That expensive esrog had the potential of being sold for a high price, while an animal set aside for sacrifice is not for sale.

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Spending Money for a Mitzvah

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Tosfos (Bava Kamma 9b) writes that it is evident from our Gemora that a person is not obligated to give up all of his possessions in order to fulfill a mitzvah, and even for a mitzvah that will pass in time, such as an esrog. It is further evident from the conclusion of the Gemora that one is not even obligated to give up a third of his possessions in order to fulfill a mitzvah. And furthermore, it is said regarding charity: One who gives liberally to charity should not give more than a fifth of his money, for then, he will be forced to beg for support himself.

All Mitzvos

The Rosh writes that this halacha applies by all mitzvos; one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth on any specific mitzva, such as esrog or lulav. The Rambam and Rema seem to rule accordingly.

Why not Spend?

The Rishonim ask: Why would someone be exempt from performing a mitzvah just because it costs more than a fifth of his wealth? The Ra’avad answers that this is similar to halacha that one should make his Shabbos like an ordinary weekday, and not be forced to be supported from charity. This is because poverty is regarded as death, and one is not obligated to give up his life for an ordinary mitzvah.

The Biur Halachah writes (in his explanation of an opinion from the Beis Yosef) that not all mitzvos are compared to charity, for charity is a mitzvah that will not pass in time, and even if the poor people are before him, they can be supported by another person. That is why one would not be obligated to spend more than a tenth of his possessions. However, with respect to a mitzvah that will pass in time, it is possible that there would be an obligation to spend more than a tenth.

Reb Yaakov Emden asks: Why isn’t there an obligation to spend more for a positive commandment? Did we not learn regarding one who does not want to fulfill a positive commandment – we beat him until his soul departs him? Do we treat his money stricter than his life?

The Maharitz Chayus answers that we only beat him until his soul departs him when he is rebelling against the fulfillment of mitzvos; otherwise, we do not beat him, and he would not be required to spend all his money for it.

Lo Sa’aseh is Different

The Ra’avad adds that this halacha applies only to a positive commandment; however, one would be required to spend his entire wealth in order not to transgress a negative precept.

Must he Spend a Fifth?

The Gemora (Kesuvos 50a) states that one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth to fulfill a mitzvah; is one halachically required to spend up to that amount, or is it only regarded as a mitzvah?

The Beis Yosef (Y”D; 249) writes that it is considered a mitzvah in the preferable manner if one spends up to a fifth of his wealth in order to perform a mitzvah. The Beis Yosef adds that although one can imply from the Gemora that it is not even a mitzvah to spend that amount because the Gemora states: One who spends liberally should not give more than a fifth of his wealth; however, even less than that would be regarded as spending liberally, and there would be no mitzvah whatsoever to spend that amount. Nevertheless, there is a Yerushalmi in Pe’ah that seems to indicate that there is a mitzvah to spend up to one-fifth of his wealth for a mitzvah.

In the sefer Ahavas Chesed, the Chafetz Chaim cites a Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos, who writes that there is a halachic obligation to spend up to one-fifth of one’s wealth for charity. He asks form our Gemora, which would seem to indicate that there is no such obligation. He answers that our Gemora is discussing a case where the poor people are not present and someone is searching to find them in order to give them charity. In such a situation, there is not even a mitzvah to give up to one-fifth. However, the Yerushalmi and the Rambam are speaking about a case where the poor person is in front of you; then, there would be a halachic obligation to give up to one-fifth.

Spending More than a Fifth

What if one wants to spend more than a fifth? Is he allowed to? It is evident from the Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos that it is regarded as virtuous (midas chassidus) for one to spend more than a fifth. However, it can be inferred from the Rambam in halachos that one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth on a mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim reconciles the two rulings of the Rambam in the same manner as before. If the poor person is present, it would be regarded as midas chassidus to spend more than a fifth, and that is what the Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos is discussing. However, when the poor people are not present and one is chasing after them, he should not spend more than a fifth.

The Shitah Mekubetzes writes that one is permitted to spend more than a fifth of his wealth if it is to support the studying of Torah. The Ahavas Chesed explains the reasoning for this. One who supports another fellow to learn Torah is creating a partnership with him; the supporter receives a reward together with the one who is learning the Torah. One is permitted to purchase this reward for himself even if it will cost him more than a fifth.

Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe (Y”D, 4:37) rules that this is correct only if the supporter specifically negotiates with the one studying Torah to create a partnership of Yissochar and Zevulun. However, if the provider is just donating money to support Torah, he is not permitted to give more than a fifth.

The Ibn Ezra in Mishlei (4:7) writes that one is permitted to spend more than a fifth of his wealth in order to study Torah himself. The Chafetz Chaim in Likutei Halachos (Yoma 12a) also rules like that. However, the Netziv in the Shiltos states that this is a matter of dispute between two Amoraim. The Gemora in Eruvin cites the verse that Torah is not in the Heavens. Rav Avdimi says: If it would be in the heavens, one would be obligated to go there and learn. It is evident that one would be forced to spend more than a fifth of his wealth to study Torah, for otherwise, he could claim that it costs too much to travel to the Heaven. However, Rava disagrees regarding the interpretation of that verse, and according to him, one would not be allowed to spend more than a fifth in order to study Torah.

The Rema (Y”D, 249:1) seems to hold that one can give away more than one-fifth of his wealth to charity right before he dies. It is brought in the name of Rabbeinu Yonah that even then, he should not.

It is written in Ahavas Chesed that one who is a free-spender in regards to himself and his family, i.e., he splurges on expensive clothing, builds for himself a fancy mansion and generally leads a luxurious lifestyle; it is permitted for him to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth.

Some say that if one finds himself in dire straits, he is permitted to spend more than a fifth with the intention that it should be on account of this deed that he will merit a salvation. It is brought in the name of the Bnei Yissoschar that one who requires atonement on a specific sin is also permitted to give away more than a fifth.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Wrong Place Esrog

Rabbi Yosi rules that if one forgets and carries the lulav to a public domain on Shabbos, he is not liable since he was preoccupied with a mitzva. Abaye qualifies this to be referring to a case where he had not fulfilled the mitzva yet. The Gemora asks that he seemingly would automatically fulfill the mitzva when he picks up the lulav. Abaye answers that he turned it around and therefore did not discharge his obligation.

Rashi explains that he turned the esrog over with the pittum down. Rabbeinu Chananel learns that he took the lulav in his left hand and the esrog in his right hand.

The Ritva asks that even if he placed the lulav in the wrong hand, he nonetheless fulfills the mitzva? Chasam Sofer answers that by switching hands he is indicating that he does not intend to fulfill the mitzva now.

This can be the source for the two options brought down in halacha regarding the reciting of the brocha on the lulav. In Shulchan Aruch, it states that one should hold the esrog upside down during the brocha in order that the brocha will be prior to the performance of the mitzva. The Gra rules that one should have intention that he does not want to fulfill the mitzva at this moment and this will be sufficient even if the esrog is being held correctly.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 29 - Four Species and Hashem's Name

Rashi writes that a dry lulav is invalid because the mitzvah must be mehuderes, performed with a beautiful object, as it is said this is my G-d and I shall beautify Him, and we learn from this verse that one should beautify himself before HaShem when fulfilling a mitzvah. Tosfos questions the words of Rashi from the Gemara earlier on Daf 11b that states that the mitzvah of glorifying a mitzvah is only a Halacha l’chatchila, preferable, but the mitzvah is not invalidated if one uses an object that is not beautiful for a mitzvah. The Gemara there states that it is preferable to tie the lulav with the hadassim and the aravos. If one does not tie the lulav with the other species, however, he has still fulfilled the mitzvah. Rav Aharon Yosef Weingarten in the Sefer HaYovel L’Chasam Sofer suggests an answer to resolve the question of Tosfos on Rashi. The Gemara in Gittin Daf 20 states that if one wrote the name of Hashem in a Sefer Torah without the proper sanctity, it is invalid. The Gemara explains that the reason for this is because of the verse that states this is my G-d and I shall beautify Him. The Bais Yosef in Orach Chaim 651 rules that one must join the esrog with the lulav in order to fulfill the mitzvah. The Bais Yosef cites the Rikanti who claimed that this secret was revealed to him in a dream. On the first night of Sukkos, a Chasid by the name of Rabbi Yitzchak appeared to the Rikanti and the Rikanti noticed that Rabbi Yitzchak was writing the Name of Hashem, but Rabbi Yitzchak wrote the letter hey separate from the first three letters. The Rikanti told him that this was incorrect and Rabbi Yitzchak responded that this is what is being done in the community of the Rikanti. The Rikanti protested and wrote the name of Hashem correctly. The Rikanti did not comprehend the meaning of the dream until the following morning when he observed the people in his community holding the esrog distant from the lulav. The Rikanti recalled the Medrash in Parashas Emor that states that the four species allude to the Name of HaShem. Just like the Name of HaShem must be written with all the letters adjacent to each other, the four species must also all be held together. This, then, could be the possible explanation for the opinion of Rashi. A dry lulav will be invalid ex post facto because it is lacking in the mitzvah of this is my G-d and I shall beautify Him, as the mitzvah of lulav is akin to writing the Name of HaShem. This approach is also found in the Sefer Shaarei Orah from Rav Meir Bergman.

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