Converts

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Converts are like Sapachas

Rabbi Chelbo said (Kiddushin 70) : Converts are as harmful to the Jewish people as sapachas (a type of tzara’as).

Rashi explains that this is because converts are not so meticulous in the performance of mitzvos, and those Jews who observe this behavior will become influenced by them.

Tosfos writes that each and every Jew is a guarantor for his fellow, and if converts do not perform mitzvos meticulously, they will be punished on account of them.

Tosfos rejects this explanation, for he proves that when the Jewish people accepted to be guarantors for each other, they did not accept to be guarantors for the converts as well.

Tosfos brings another explanation: They are harmful to the Jews, for it is impossible that someone will not bother them, and the punishment for this will be severe, for the Torah in twenty-four places warn the Jewish people not to bother the converts.

Tosfos brings another explanation: It is because of the converts that we are still in exile, for the Gemora says that Klal Yisroel are scattered all over the world much more so than other nations in order for there to be additional converts.

Rabbeinu Avraham the convert explains differently: It is because the converts are meticulous in their performance of the mitzvos. This shows the shortcomings of ordinary Jews.

TEACHING TORAH TO A GENTILE PLANNING ON CONVERTING
The Rambam (Issurei Bi’ah 14:2) writes that we inform the prospective convert the essentials of the faith, which is the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry, and they go on at great length about these matters.

The Machaneh Chaim (Y”D II, 45) asks: Why isn’t this forbidden on account of a gentile studying Torah? The Gemora in Sanhedrin (59a) states explicitly that a non-Jew who studies Torah is liable for death.

He answers by citing a Medrash Tanchuma in Parshas Vayelech: The numerical value of Torah is six hundred and eleven. The remaining two mitzvos which complete the six hundred and thirteen are the two mitzvos which were given by Hashem directly at Har Sinai. This is the explanation of the verse: The Torah that Moshe commanded us to observe. Moshe instructed us regarding six hundred and eleven mitzvos; the other two were from Hashem.

The prohibition against teaching an idolater Torah is only applicable to the six hundred and eleven mitzvos that Moshe taught us. The other two, I am Hashem your God and the Unity of God; one would be permitted to teach to them. This is where the Rambam derived his ruling from; we can go on with great length discussing the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry.

The Maharsha (Shabbos 31a) writes that it is permitted to teach Torah to an idolater who wishes to convert. He proves this from the incident with Hillel and the convert.

Reb Akiva Eiger (41) disagrees and maintains that it is forbidden to teach Torah to an idolater even if he is planning on converting. Hillel taught the convert Torah only after he converted.

NOT BELIEVING A SCHOLAR
At that time, the plaintiff spoke up and said to Rav Yehudah, “Is it me that you call a slave, when, in fact, I descend from the Chasmonai family!” Rav Yehudah responded, “Shmuel has said that whoever says that he is from the Chashmonai family is in truth a slave (for Herod had killed them all out).

Rav Nachman said to Rav Yehudah, “Do you not hold of that which Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rav Huna, who said in the name of Rav: Wherever a scholar issues a halachic ruling (that was previously unknown) and such a point comes up for a practical decision, he is obeyed if he made the statement before the incident occurred, but if the statement was made only after the incident occurred, he is not obeyed (and therefore, we do not have to accept this ruling which you stated in the name of Shmuel)!?

Rav Yehudah replied, “But there is Rav Masnah who holds like me as well?” Rav Masnah was not seen in Nehardea for thirteen years, but just that day, he came before them. Rav Yehudah asked him, “Does the master remember that which Shmuel said while he had one foot on the bank of the river and the other foot was on a boat?” Rav Masnah replied, “Shmuel said, ‘whoever says that he is from the Chashmonai family is in truth a slave, for no one remained from their family except for one maiden who went up on the roof and called out with a loud voice, “whoever says that he is from the Chashmonai family is in truth a slave.” She then threw herself off the roof and died.’”

Rav Nachman declared that the man was indeed a slave. That day, they ripped up many kesuvos in Nehardea (all the married woman from that man’s family lost their kesuvos).

From Rashi’s commentary (Yevamos 77a), it would seem that the reason we do not accept the scholar’s statement is because we are concerned that he might deliberately falsify the halachah.

The Ritva forcefully disputes this. Heaven forbid that a Torah scholar would deliberately falsify the ruling. Rather, the reason why we don’t believe him in these situations is because he might make a mistake; in the excitement of the moment, it would appear to him that he remembers the tradition in one manner, when in fact, it is really the opposite.

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Follow the Father - Kiddushin 67

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The braisa states: How do we know that if a male from any nation (other than the seven nations of Canaan, where by the other nations, the prohibition of “you shall not spare the life of any soul” does not apply) cohabited with a Canaanite woman (where the prohibition of “you shall not spare the life of any soul” does apply) and had a child; one is permitted to purchase that child as a slave (for he follows the father’s nationality and we are not obligated to kill him)? The braisa answers: It is written [Vayikra 25:44]: And also from among the children of the residents who live with you, from among them you may purchase slaves. One might have thought that even if a Canaanite male cohabited with a woman from any of the other nations and had a child; one would be permitted to purchase that child as a slave. It is therefore written [ibid.]: ….whom they begot in your land. The Torah teaches us that one may purchase slaves only from those who were born in your land to Canaanite mothers from non-Canaanite fathers, but not from among those children who were born abroad to non-Canaanite mothers from Canaanite fathers, and who later returned to reside in your land with their fathers.

The Minchas Chinuch writes that the halachah of following the male by the other nations is only if the child was born from an idolater woman; however, if she converted while she was pregnant, the child is legitimate and he does not follow the father, provided that the mother is permitted to join the congregation. He adds that even according to those who hold that the fetus is not regarded as the “thigh of the mother,” nevertheless, the lineage of idolaters is determined only after their birth, but as a fetus, they are not accorded the status of the father. And therefore, in this case, the child was born as a Jew, and therefore he follows the mother.

This halachah is applicable even in a case which causes us to rule stringently. If the father would be from a nationality which is permitted to join the congregation and the mother was an Egyptian woman, and she converted while she was pregnant, the child will be accorded the status of its mother and would therefore be ruled to be a second-generation Egyptian.

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Teaching Torah to an Idolater who Plans on Converting - Kiddushin 62

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The Rambam (Issurei Bi’ah 14:2) writes that we inform the prospective convert the essentials of the faith, which is the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry, and they go on at great length about these matters.

The Machaneh Chaim (Y”D II, 45) asks: Why isn’t this forbidden on account of a gentile studying Torah? The Gemora in Sanhedrin (59a) states explicitly that a non-Jew who studies Torah is liable for death.

He answers by citing a Medrash Tanchuma in Parshas Vayelech: The numerical value of Torah is six hundred and eleven. The remaining two mitzvos which complete the six hundred and thirteen are the two mitzvos which were given by Hashem directly at Har Sinai. This is the explanation of the verse: The Torah that Moshe commanded us to observe. Moshe instructed us regarding six hundred and eleven mitzvos; the other two were from Hashem.

The prohibition against teaching an idolater Torah is only applicable to the six hundred and eleven mitzvos that Moshe taught us. The other two, I am Hashem your God and the Unity of God; one would be permitted to teach to them. This is where the Rambam derived his ruling from; we can go on with great length discussing the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry.

The Maharsha (Shabbos 31a) writes that it is permitted to teach Torah to an idolater who wishes to convert. He proves this from the incident with Hillel and the convert.

Reb Akiva Eiger (41) disagrees and maintains that it is forbidden to teach Torah to an idolater even if he is planning on converting. Hillel taught the convert Torah only after he converted.

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Kiddushin with a Slavewoman

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak (Daf Yomi: Gittin 40b) explains the braisa to be dealing with the following case: The master told her, “Become free with this deed (of betrothal) and be betrothed to me with this.” [In this case, she was obviously not freed from beforehand.] Rabbi Meir holds that this expression (be betrothed) includes emancipation (for she cannot become betrothed to him unless he frees her first), and the Chachamim maintain that it does not include emancipation.

Tosfos in Yevamos (47b) asks: How can the kiddushin be effective if the slave did not immerse herself in a mikvah beforehand? The halachah is that after a slave becomes free, he is immersed in a mikvah to become a complete Jew. If so, this woman is still a slave, and kiddushin is not effective with a slave!?

Tosfos answers that we are dealing with a case where she immersed herself prior to the kiddushin.

The Nimukei Yosef states that the requirement for this immersion is only Rabbinical, and therefore, the kiddushin will be Biblically effective even if she did not immerse beforehand.

Reb Chaim Brisker asks that both of these answers will not resolve the issue according to the Rambam. He proves that the Rambam holds that this immersion is a Biblical requirement. This is because the Rambam maintains that this immersion is a completion of her conversion process. If so, asks Reb Chaim, it is obviously a Biblical requirement and it also cannot be done before she becomes free, for it is part of her conversion process and that can only be accomplished after she becomes free! How would the Rambam understand our Gemora? How can the kiddushin be effective with a slavewoman?

He answers as follows: A freed slave requires immersion in order to accept upon himself those halachos that he was lacking while he was still a slave, for at that time, he was not a complete Jew. This, however, has no bearing on the fact that kiddushin is not effective with a slave or a slavewoman. That, the Gemora in Kiddushin (68a) explains is because a slave does not have any lineage (yuchasin). A slave, in this respect, is inferior to an idolater, for an idolater does have lineage. As soon as the slave is freed and he is no longer a slave, he does have lineage, even though his conversion was not completed, for even an idolater has lineage. It is for this reason that kiddushin can be effective in this case even though she did not immerse in the mikvah yet. For in order for the kiddushin to be effective, it is not necessary for her to have a completed conversion; as long as she is not a slave is sufficient, and since at the moment she becomes free, she is no longer a slave, kiddushin may take effect.

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FOOD FOR THOUGHT - Yevamos 79 - Daf Yomi

*** Why did Dovid wait another year to investigate other sins; as soon as he saw that it wasn’t because of idol worship, he should have checked if it was because of promiscuous behavior?

*** Why did Dovid wait three years until inquiring of the Urim Vetumim?

*** According to the opinion that maintains that a eulogy is for the sake of the living, why were the Jewish people punished for not eulogizing Shaul correctly? They obviously were mochel it?

*** What happens if there is a person that only has one or two of the characteristics of a Jew, but he doesn’t have all three?

*** Why does the Gemora state that it is better to uproot one word in the Torah etc.? They uprooted an entire verse.

*** How did they accept one hundred and fifty thousand converts after this incident? We previously learned that they didn’t accept converts in the times of Dovid and Shlomo.

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CIRCUMCISION QUESTIONS - Yevamos 71 - Daf Yomi

*** The Gemora states: The words in the verse teach us that a circumcised Arab and a circumcised Gibeonite are included in the prohibition against eating from the Pesach offering.

The Gemora asks: But aren’t these people considered circumcised? We learned in a Mishna: If one takes a vow that he will not derive any pleasure from areilim (uncircumcised people), he is permitted to derive pleasure from uncircumcised Jews, but he is prohibited from deriving pleasure from a circumcised idolater. If one takes a vow that he will not derive any pleasure from mulim (circumcised people), he is permitted to derive pleasure from circumcised idolaters, but he is prohibited from deriving pleasure from an uncircumcised Jew. (It is evident that a circumcised idolater is regarded as uncircumcised.)

What is the comparison between the two cases? Perhaps it can be said that regarding vows, the halacha is that we interpret his words based on the vernacular, and an idolater is described as being uncircumcised even though they in fact are circumcised.

*** Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a convert who circumcised, but did not immerse himself yet in a mikvah is considered a full-fledged Jew; and he maintains that a child who born circumcised does not need covenantal blood to flow from him.

The Rama rules that if one circumcises a child at night, he is required to cause covenantal blood to flow from him. He also rules that if one circumcises a child before he is eight days old, he is not required to cause covenantal blood to flow from him.

What is the difference between the two cases?

*** Rava explained the braisa (the father was not considered negligent for not circumcising his son at the time of the slaughtering of the korban Pesach, but he is negligent for not circumcising him at the time of the eating) to be referring to a case where the father and mother of the child were released from prison after their korban was slaughtered. (An agent slaughtered the korban for them, but the circumcision of their child is incumbent on them to perform.)

Rashi explains that the mitzvah of circumcision rests on the father and the mother.

Doesn’t the Gemora in Kiddushin state that a woman is exempt from circumcising her son based on a verse in the Torah?

Why can’t the father appoint an agent to circumcise his son for him?

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FULFILLING A MITZVAH AT THE TIME OF THE OBLIGATION - Yevamos 62 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states: If he had children while he was an idolater, and then he converted; Rabbi Yochanan said: He has fulfilled his obligation of procreation (with the children born before his conversion). Rish Lakish said: He did not fulfill his obligation.

The Gemora in Rosh Hashanah (28a) states: They sent to the father of Shmuel a halacha that if the Persians forced someone to eat matzah on Pesach night, he has fulfilled his obligation.

The Gemora states further that if he was temporarily deranged at the time that he performed the mitzvah, he has not fulfilled his obligation.

The Turei Even asks from our Gemora: The idolater is not commanded in the mitzvah of procreation; how can the convert discharge his obligation with the children born to him at the time that he wasn’t obligated in the mitzvah?

The Minchas Chinuch (1:15) comments: Since the halachic ruling is that if one had children and they subsequently died, he has not discharged his obligation, it is apparent that the mitzvah is the having of children, cohabitation is only a preparatory action. Accordingly, we can answer the Turei Even’s question. One cannot discharhe his obligation for a mitzvah at a time that he is not obligated in the mitzvah, such as a deranged person eating matzah. This principle is only applicable if the mitzvah is the action; it must be performed at the time that he is obligated in the mitzvah. However, regarding a mitzvah where the action is only a preparation for the mitzvah, the principle would not apply. The idolater cohabited with a woman and had children; afterwards he converted. The mitzvah of procreation is having the children, and now that he is a Jew, he is fulfilling the mitzvah presently.

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CONVERT DELAYING - Yevamos 48 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora cites a braisa regarding converts: Rabbi Chanania son of Rabban Gamliel said: Why are converts nowadays afflicted, and suffer constant hardships? It is because they did not observe the seven Noahide laws prior to their conversion.

Rabbi Yosi disagrees because a convert is regarded as a newborn baby; he cannot be punished for sins committed before his conversion. The reason they are afflicted is because they do not observe all the details of each mitzvah like other Jews do.

Abba Chanan said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: It is because they do not fulfill the mitzvos out of love, but rather out of fear.

Others say: It is because they delayed in entering under the wings of the Shechinah.

The commentators ask on this last reason: Is there an obligation for an idolater to convert; he is not commanded to observe all the mitzvos? Furthermore, we even attempt to dissuade him from converting; how can they be punished for tarrying?

Reb Yaakov Emden answers: The Gemora is referring to the time that they delayed after they reached their conclusion that they plan on converting. Once they have decided to enter under the wings of the Shechinah, and nevertheless, they delay, they are punished for this laziness.

Based on this, he answers a question posed by Tosfos. The Gemora derives that a convert is punished for delaying from the blessing that Boaz bestowed on Rus. Rus converted expeditiously, and was therefore rewarded. Tosfos asks that it emerges from the pesukim and through calculations that Rus was extremely old when she converted; how can the Gemora state that she did not delay? Reb Yaakov Emden explains: Perhaps she was old when she converted, but once she decided to convert, she did not waste any time, and converted immediately.

Reb Avi Lebowitz uses this interpretation to explain why the braisa (47b) had stated: If he accepts, we circumcise him immediately. The Gemora explains: This is because we apply the principle that we do not delay the performance of a mitzvah. Perhaps the concern with delaying is not from the perspective of Beis Din, but rather we encourage the convert to act quickly, so that he will not be punished for delaying the process.

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TEACHING TORAH TO A GENTILE PLANNING ON CONVERTING - Yevamos 47 - Daf Yomi

The Rambam (Issurei Bi’ah 14:2) writes that we inform the prospective convert the essentials of the faith, which is the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry, and they go on at great length about these matters.

The Machaneh Chaim ((Y”D II, 45) asks: Why isn’t this forbidden on account of a gentile studying Torah? The Gemora in Sanhedrin (59a) states explicitly that a non-Jew who studies Torah is liable for death.

He answers by citing a Medrash Tanchuma in Parshas Vayelech: The numerical value of Torah is six hundred and eleven. The remaining two mitzvos which complete the six hundred and thirteen are the two mitzvos which were given by Hashem directly at Har Sinai. This is the explanation of the verse: The Torah that Moshe commanded us to observe. Moshe instructed us regarding six hundred and eleven mitzvos; the other two were from Hashem.

The prohibition against teaching an idolater Torah is only applicable to the six hundred and eleven mitzvos that Moshe taught us. The other two, I am Hashem your God and the Unity of God; one would be permitted to teach to them. This is where the Rambam derived his ruling from; we can go on with great length discussing the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry.

The Maharsha (Shabbos 31a) writes that it is permitted to teach Torah to an idolater who wishes to convert. He proves this from the incident with Hillel and the convert.

Reb Akiva Eiger (41) disagrees and maintains that it is forbidden to teach Torah to an idolater even if he is planning on converting. Hillel taught the convert Torah only after he converted.

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CONVERSIONS BY REB JAY - Yevamos 28 (actually 24) - Daf Yomi

A conversion must be done lishma, i.e, with the desire of accepting the Torah and joining Klal Yisroel. Therefore, one cannot convert for marriage or any other external reason.

Because of this, during certain periods in Jewish history, converts were not accepted. For example, during the reign of Dovid Hamelech, converts were not accepted due to a concern that their acceptance was based on fear (due to the strength of Dovid’s army). Similarly, during the days of Shlomo Hamelech there were no conversions due to a concern that the conversions were based on a desire for prestige (as Klal Yisroel at that time was considered to be the jewel of the world).

The Rambam notes that although technically converts were not accepted at these times, there were Beis Din Hedyotos (Common Courts) that did accept converts. How was the status of these converts resolved?

The Rambam writes that their status was pending; if they saw after a period of time that these converts were still keeping the mitzvos, it could be assumed that their conversion was legitimate, and they were considered to be Jews retroactive to their conversion (meaning, for example, if it was a woman who had a child during the waiting period, the child was considered to be Jewish).

Perhaps we can use this principle to understand a difficulty in MegilasRus. Boaz married Rus as a redeemer of the property of Noami (and Rus was an extension of this due to her being the wife of the cousin of Boaz--Machlon). However, if Rus was a converts, then we know that a converts is regarded like a newborn baby, and any prior status - which in the case of Rus would include her marriage to Machlon - should be negated?

Using the principle of the Rambam we can say that Rus initially converted prior to marrying Machlon; however, there were doubts regarding her conversion (as it appeared that it was done for marriage). Therefore, her conversion had a probation period, and once she decided to follow Noami, it was retroactively revealed that her initial conversion (at the time of her marriage) was legitimate, and she fell under the category of things that could be redeemed by a redeemer (Boaz).

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 22 - A CONVERT WHO CONVERTS

The Gemora states: A convert who converts is regarded as a newborn baby (and thus has no pre-existing family relationships).

Why does it say “a convert who converts,” wouldn’t it be more correct by saying “a gentile who converts”? He is not a convert until he actually converts.

Margaliyos HaShas quotes from a sefer: At the time that the entire Jewish Nation was standing by Har Sinai to receive the Torah, the souls of all the future proselytes were there, as well. Some converted immediately and others took a long time, but they were all there.

This is the explanation: A convert, one whose soul was present by Har Sinai when the Jewish people received the Torah, and is now converting, is regarded as a newborn baby.

[Interesting readings relevant to converts:

http://rchaimqoton.blogspot.com/2006/06/understanding-proselytes.html

http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2006/09/convert-in-mourning.html

What brocha does a ger recite in the morning? Read more!