IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/ecogov/v26y2025i4d10.1007_s10101-025-00335-1.html

Too much science

Author

Listed:
  • Giuseppe Pernagallo

    (University of Turin, Department of Economics and Statistics “Cognetti de Martiis”)

Abstract

Scientific production is growing at an unprecedented rate, but how many of the published articles are really useful to society? Using a model of asymmetric information, I identify the conditions under which scientific journals might publish more articles than would be socially efficient. I also show that publishing all the science would certainly be inefficient. These results apply to both submission fee and free submission publication systems. To avoid this social inefficiency, policymakers could keep inefficient researchers out of the market by offering, for example, a subsidy or alternative employment in the public sector. In this sense, the division of academic labor between research and teaching would be helpful in streamlining the research market. The paper also examines the role of meritocracy, highlighting the negative consequences of decoupling researchers’ revenues from the scientific impact of their work.

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Pernagallo, 2025. "Too much science," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 469-490, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:26:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s10101-025-00335-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-025-00335-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10101-025-00335-1
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10101-025-00335-1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    --->

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Esther Landhuis, 2016. "Scientific literature: Information overload," Nature, Nature, vol. 535(7612), pages 457-458, July.
    2. Pernagallo, Giuseppe, 2024. "The student funding dilemma," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 30(C).
    3. Banshal, Sumit Kumar & Gupta, Solanki & Lathabai, Hiran H & Singh, Vivek Kumar, 2022. "Power Laws in altmetrics: An empirical analysis," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3).
    4. Feldman, Maryann & Johnson, Evan E. & Bellefleur, Remi & Dowden, Savannah & Talukder, Eshika, 2022. "Evaluating the tail of the distribution: the economic contributions of frequently awarded government R&D recipients," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(7).
    5. Vincent Larivière & Stefanie Haustein & Philippe Mongeon, 2015. "The Oligopoly of Academic Publishers in the Digital Era," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(6), pages 1-15, June.
    6. repec:plo:pone00:0093949 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Mark Armstrong, 2015. "Opening Access to Research," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 1-30, August.
    8. Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2021. "Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 314-333, June.
    9. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
    10. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2001. "The overprovision anomaly of private public good supply," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 63-78, February.
    11. Ruiz-Castillo, Javier & Costas, Rodrigo, 2014. "The skewness of scientific productivity," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 917-934.
    12. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    13. Giuseppe Pernagallo, 2024. "Overcoming asymmetric information: A data-driven approach," Chapters, in: Daphne R. Raban & Julia WÅ‚odarczyk (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Information Economics, chapter 7, pages 135-153, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Scherer, F. M. & Harhoff, Dietmar, 2000. "Technology policy for a world of skew-distributed outcomes," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4-5), pages 559-566, April.
    15. Per O. Seglen, 1992. "The skewness of science," Journal of the American Society for Information Science, Association for Information Science & Technology, vol. 43(9), pages 628-638, October.
    16. Leonid Tiokhin & Karthik Panchanathan & Daniel Lakens & Simine Vazire & Thomas Morgan & Kevin Zollman, 2021. "Honest signaling in academic publishing," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(2), pages 1-19, February.
    17. Mark J. McCabe & Christopher M. Snyder, 2005. "Open Access and Academic Journal Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 453-459, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Giuseppe Pernagallo, 2023. "Science in the mist: A model of asymmetric information for the research market," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(2), pages 390-415, May.
    2. Oliver Budzinski & Thomas Grebel & Jens Wolling & Xijie Zhang, 2020. "Drivers of article processing charges in open access," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 124(3), pages 2185-2206, September.
    3. Pernagallo, Giuseppe, 2024. "The student funding dilemma," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 30(C).
    4. Justus Haucap & Nima Moshgbar & W. Benedikt Schmal, 2021. "The impact of the German 'DEAL' on competition in the academic publishing market," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(8), pages 2027-2049, December.
    5. Innes, Robert, 1987. "Adverse Selection And Tax Externalities In A Model Of Entrepreneurial Investment," Working Papers 225812, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    6. Li, Yuanyuan & Wigniolle, Bertrand, 2017. "Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 127-141.
    7. Werner, Arndt, 2008. "Do Credit Constraints Matter more for College Dropout Entrepreneurs?," MPRA Paper 11867, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Bottai, Carlo & de Rassenfosse, Gaétan & Raiteri, Emilio, 2025. "A new approach to measuring invention commercialization: An application to the SBIR program," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(9).
    9. Patrizia Ordine & Giuseppe Rose, 2008. "Local Banks Efficiency and Employment," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 22(3), pages 469-493, September.
    10. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2015. "Cash-flow business taxation revisited: bankruptcy, risk aversion and asymmetric information," Working Papers 1531, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    11. Tuomas Takalo, 2012. "Rationales and Instruments for Public Innovation Policies," Journal of Reviews on Global Economics, Lifescience Global, vol. 1, pages 157-167.
    12. Ana Venâncio & João Jorge, 2022. "The role of accelerator programmes on the capital structure of start-ups," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 1143-1167, October.
    13. David De Meza & David C Webb, 2003. "The Near Impossibility of Credit Rationing," FMG Discussion Papers dp459, Financial Markets Group.
    14. de Meza, David & Reito, Francesco, 2019. "Too Little Lending: A Problem of Symmetric Information," MPRA Paper 93700, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Neyer, Ulrike, 2004. "Asymmetric information in credit markets--implications for the transition in Eastern Germany," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 61-78, March.
    16. Bonaccorsi, Andrea & Haddawy, Peter & Cicero, Tindaro & Hassan, Saeed-Ul, 2017. "The solitude of stars. An analysis of the distributed excellence model of European universities," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 435-454.
    17. Ahlin, Christian & Gulesci, Selim & Madestam, Andreas & Stryjan, Miri, 2020. "Loan contract structure and adverse selection: Survey evidence from Uganda," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 180-195.
    18. Francesco Cohen & Alessandro Fedele & Paolo M. Panteghini, 2016. "Corporate taxation and financial strategies under asymmetric information," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 33(1), pages 9-34, April.
    19. Vesala, Timo, 2004. "Asymmetric information in credit markets and entrepreneurial risk taking," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 14/2004, Bank of Finland.
    20. Stephan Puehringer & Johanna Rath & Teresa Griesebner, 2021. "The political economy of academic publishing: On the commodification of a public good," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(6), pages 1-21, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:26:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s10101-025-00335-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.