With "Friends" Like Yemen's, No Enemies Needed

In early January 2011, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton landed in Sana'a to manage the autocratic habits of a useful ally in the war against al-Qaeda.

Having warned other allies (Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria) of a youth bulge prior to the Arab uprisings, the Secretary now found herself just above the surface of a volcano as she mingled with Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. U.S. policy needed his approval to facilitate an expansion of military and counter-terrorism platforms in the country, but that need required less antagonistic leadership atop the government. For Clinton, this meant walking Saleh away from a parliamentary proposal that would eliminate term limits and allow him to run indefinitely, which he eventually agreed to in return for Washington's political and military assistance.

“We support an inclusive government,” Clinton replied when asked how the Obama administration could support Saleh's government and human rights at the same time. “We see that Yemen is going through a transition. And you’re right: it could one way or the other. It could go the right way or the wrong way.”

Yemen's revolution would spark weeks after Clinton shook hands with Saleh and departed the capital, never to return. Despite her professed support for a representative government, the Obama administration first treated Yemen's uprising as an obstruction to be neutralized, fearing a loss of influence with the next government. During this time al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) capitalized on Saleh's distraction in the cities to expand its ranks and territorial control in Yemen's southern governorates; Saleh's U.S.-trained counter-terrorism forces aided the process by fighting Yemen's revolutionaries and tribesmen rather than terrorists. However this chain of events ultimately created an opportunity for Washington and its allies, namely Saudi Arabia and European partners, to replace the duplicitous Saleh with his vice president and continue their policies unimpeded.

President Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, "elected" through the UN's single-candidate referendum in February 2012, doubles as a leading proponent of U.S. drone strikes in Yemen.

This hegemonic policy was displayed again on Thursday when the Obama administration released a two-part press notice from the White House and State Department. Lying to the American people when talking Yemen, unfortunately, is simpler and easier than stealing candy from a baby. The American majority lives in ignorance of Yemen's troubles and their government's own interference in the country. Chronic fear of al-Qaeda and a high degree of hostility, reminiscent of American attitudes towards Pakistanis and Iraqis, contribute to this detachment, which in turn allows the Obama administration to interfere in Yemen's affairs without domestic cost.

Lack of political incentives to support the Yemeni people have endangered them in multiple ways: undermining their quest for representative government, damaging property and life without legal recourse, and ensuring that AQAP retains a presence in their country. Such a defeat in the war for "hearts and minds" is especially tragic when considering Yemenis' fondness for Americans themselves.

Current U.S. policy presents a view diametrically opposed to Yemen's streets, where the actions of Washington and its allies have obstructed a continuation of the revolution.

"Over the past 15 months,” U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns told the latest "Friends of Yemen" Ministerial, "Yemen – with the support of all of its friends – has made important progress in implementing the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative. Yemenis elected a new leader for the first time in three decades, launched a major reform of their armed forces, regained control of large areas of their national territory held by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and today stand on the cusp of an historic National Dialogue."

Burns' statements are constructed on the boundary of inaccuracy. Yemenis selected Hadi out of necessity and coercion rather than free will, while Hadi himself was tasked to clean up a mess made by Saleh and the foreign policies that supported him. The so-called GCC initiative also excluded the same youth that the White House claims to support. Instead, the power-sharing agreement granted immunity for Saleh's human rights abuses (some committed with U.S. equipment), as well as preserving military influence with the new government. That U.S. interests in Yemen have improved since Saleh's resignation is unquestionable, even as U.S. policy remains unpopular with everyone outside the GCC initiative: the independent revolutionaries, northern-based Houthi sect and secessionist-minded Southern Movement.

Yemen's youth received the least seats of all parties - nearly four times less than Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) - in the heralded National Dialogue.

Further complicating the situation, the GCC's power-sharing agreement obstructs deeply-rooted political causes in the north and south, as their autonomous designs threaten the central government's authority and, by extension, involved foreign powers. In mid-February the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) released a statement warning against interference in Yemen's affairs, only this statement targeted Saleh to the extent that it isolated a former Vice President and current Southern activist, Ali Salim Al-Beidh. The statement had minimal effect on Saleh, who copied the UNSC's message (minus himself) during a speech to commemorate Hadi's promotion, but it did spark Southern protests that led to clashes with the government and oppositional Islah party.

Hadi eventually met with Southern leaders to ease tensions and coax them into the National Dialogue, but the movement's leaders and followers remain leery of participating under UN-GCC terms. While a national dialogue is needed to advance Yemen's revolution, the present environment could degenerate into political warfare between the ruling GPC, Islah and Hirak.

To some credit U.S. non-military assistance has increased since the revolution launched in January 2011. Problematically, the long-term reality in Yemen indicates that these measures serve as camouflage for widespread geopolitical interference. U.S. aid has risen above $100 million to keep pace with a similar figure in the military column, and this information is used to promote a comprehensive policy. Since military and counterterrorism spending is especially obscured in Yemen, one of Washington's biggest "small wars," State Department officials and CIA Director John Brennan can now claim with greater safety that non-military spending exceeds military spending.

However U.S. policy remains decisively oriented towards influencing Yemen's political and military spheres - economic development and humanitarian support furthers this goal.

Yemen's revolution is effectively over in the eyes of UN, EU and GCC powers, and they have stopped at nothing to control its "transition." In their world 2014's elections will continue the reforms started by Hadi and Yemen will be gradually integrated into the GCC with Western assistance. Far from genuinely helping its people, U.S. policy in Yemen currently amounts to a joint neocolonialist takeover with neighboring Saudi Arabia, whose government rivals Washington and Tehran in unpopularity. All have worked tirelessly to prevent a national revolution in Yemen, while at the same time claiming to advance it.

"The transition is about to enter a new, critical, phase," Burns told his audience in London. "While Yemenis courageously work to rebuild their country, extremists and their patrons are working hard to tear it down. The Co-Chairs called on all parties to commit to the principle of non-interference and the unity, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Yemen. This is an effort we endorse in the strongest terms."

Rampant foreign interference is no secret amongst Yemenis and concerned observers. Burns' own statements demonstrate the oxymoronic forces at work: supporting Yemen's unity and territorial integrity, for instance, directly contradicts the principles of sovereignty and independence. Washington, Riyadh and their allies are not looking to create a new future based on self-determination, but to recreate Yemen's old hegemonic model using new tactics and materials.

These "friends" will sell anything except the truth to Yemenis and Americans alike.

"National Dialogue" Masks Foreign Interference In Yemen

UN envoy Jamal Benomar presents a distorted view of Yemen's situation and the GCC's power-sharing agreement via a Saudi daily: "The Yemenis have done this without any foreign dictates."

To be fair to him, though, the general script of his interview was presumably written by those working above him:

Yemen is perhaps the most troubled state in the Middle East with a history of poverty, civil war and division. Uncertainty about its future following the instability that led to and followed the resignation of its former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, has prompted regional and UN intervention in a bid to prevent the state from descending into chaos.

The first meetings of a conference that brings together political parties, regional factions, interest groups and civil society organizations from across the country will get underway soon, in a bid to stabilize the situation. Prompted by the UN and Yemen’s neighbors, Yemen’s quarreling groups will attempt to thrash out a settlement on elections and a new constitution among other issues, a settlement that many hope will allow Yemen to avoid secession and possible civil war.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to Jamal Benomar, an Assistant Secretary-General of the UN and the organization’s special envoy to Yemen, who has played an important role in the organization of the forthcoming National Dialogue Conference. Speaking by telephone, Benomar told Asharq Al-Awsat about his hopes for the conference, the obstacles it faces, and the efforts of the UN and Yemen’s neighbors to assist the process of a peaceful transfer of power in the troubled state.

Read Interview:

Amid Peace Talks, Bahrain's Monarchy Cries Iran

The Bahraini monarchy's second attempt at a poorly-named "National Dialogue" has become inevitably obscured by the haze of asymmetric warfare. Given the common theory that King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa's regime is provoking Bahrain's opposition to justify harsh retaliation - whether jailing its leadership or shooting its youth - one must speculate on the timing between political negotiations and the February 14th anniversary. The monarchy clearly anticipated demonstrations on this day and has worked diligently to exploit their fallout in its favor.

Restarting the National Dialogue after its first government-induced collapse accomplishes multiple objectives at once: the opposition's actions in the streets are subverted by diplomatic outreach and ultimately held responsible for any failures at the negotiating table.

Days of running battles between protesters and security forces have also presented an opportune time to announce Bahrain's latest "terrorist cell" and bomb plot, courtesy of Iran's shadow. After highlighting the government's own casualties and the vicious actions of "saboteurs," meaning rock and Molotov-throwing youth protesters, Minister of Interior Lt-General Shaikh Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa informed a televised audience that a 2-kg bomb had been defused at the King Fahd Causeway. Five men linked to Iran's Revolutionary Guard already stand accused of receiving training in a camp along the Syrian-Lebanese, and allegedly admitted (during interrogation) that they planned to start a terrorist organization in Bahrain.

Accordingly, Al-Khalifa confirmed the arrest of eight individuals with "links to Iran, Iraq and Lebanon," where they received weapons and explosives training similar to the previous cells.

The possibility that Iran and its proxies are operating through Bahrain is high, but they are equally unlikely to cooperate with the island's opposition. These actors are pursuing their own ends rather than the democratic opposition's cause of political representation, and in doing have been conveniently shackled to the youth and Al Wefaq. The Iranian specter undermines Bahrain's opposition too efficiently for anyone other than the Bahraini monarchy's enjoyment - combined with Saudi backing and America's Fifth Fleet, Iranian-funded terror cells and bombs form the trump cards in its arsenal. Now, instead of covering the disproportionate force that triggers civil disobedience, Bahrain's narrative in the international media has mutated into terrorist plots.

The contrived elements of this situation are rendered evident by the precise media roll out of Bahraini officials, beginning with hardline Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa and his speech of "unity." Regardless of the messenger, the overall message of King Hamad's royal circle remains unchanged: cast protesters as the island's problem and King Hamad's rule as the solution.

"We will not be discouraged by the actions of those who are intent on undermining the stability and peaceful endeavors of Bahrain's government," the Interior Minister declared on Saturday night. "Ours is a nation committed to reforms, human rights and the rule of law."

All of these transparent moves are too insincere to improve the noxious climate of Bahrain's National Dialogue.

Foreign Insensitivity Showers Yemen's Crisis

Despite being publicized on several occasions during its multi-year operations, America's "secret" drone base in Saudi Arabia has flooded the international media cycle with recycled news and non-revelations. All that is being reported is the base's leading "architect," John Brennan, and the rationale behind concealing U.S. drones in Saudi Arabia. The location of the drone base itself - the only missing link - remains a mystery and doesn't alter the story greatly.

U.S. imperialism in the Gulf is no secret, and neither is the cycle of warfare perpetuated by U.S. and Saudi policies in the region.

Whether or not Washington accepts al-Qaeda's creation as a response to U.S. troops in the Holy Land, this grievance connects a loop of propaganda and violence that won't broke so long as U.S. troops and war machines remain inside Saudi Arabia. The Obama administration, at least on the surface, even acknowledges this dilemma while pursuing an uncompromising course of action on the Arabian Peninsula. Karen DeYoung, who covers national security for The Washington Post, told NPR's All Things Considered that the administration kept the base off record "because of sensitivities in Saudi Arabia itself." False sensitivity is the result - knowing something is offensive but doing it anyway.

"Because of their internal politics and because of what they see as their position in the Islamic world, they didn't want it published that they were allowing the CIA to actually occupy real estate inside Saudi Arabia."

Equally disturbing is the notion that Riyadh's interests, and not the average Yemeni's, dictates the information surrounding U.S. drone operations inside Yemen. Being bombed and monitored without recourse is frightening enough - opposing U.S.-Saudi air strikes and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) isn't mutually exclusive - without the internal threat. Flying drones out of Saudi Arabia, a popular enemy in Yemen, simply adds fuel to a long-standing fire and runs contrary to the essence of counterinsurgency. The base offers one example of why true COIN isn't being pursued in Yemen, as imperialism interferes with relating to the population.

Another insensitive act has also emerged on the horizon and, at this point, is less certain than the aforementioned injustice. On the positive side, Yemeni state media finally announced the participants and starting date for the country's National Dialogue after a four-month delay. The necessity of a conference is beyond doubt, but the same cannot be said for its prospects, and a tense situation could escalate further now that a new date has been assigned: March 18th.

This pivotal day rests at the heart of Yemen's ongoing revolution. Two years ago Saleh's security forces (including snipers) opened fire on Freedom Square in Sana'a, killing at least 52 protesters and wounding over a hundred. The massacre would bring the wealthy al-Ahmar brothers and their tribal militia into the streets, trigger the defection of Saleh's northern commander, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and squeeze the first statements out of President Barack Obama after two months of demonstrations. However no one was held accountable due to Yemen's gridlocked politics and the U.S.-sponsored GCC initiative, which granted Saleh and his family immunity from human rights abuses.

Now Yemen's National Dialogue is scheduled to open without any resolution to Saleh's crimes or restitution for the martyrs' families. While Ali Mohsen and Saleh's son, Ahmed, were reassigned by Transitional President Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi in early January, they will also remain in their positions for up to six months and stand a good chance of receiving new commands. Thus the National Dialogue will unfold in the presence of Yemen's counterrevolutionary powers, reinforcing the obstructive influence that Saleh maintains in Sana'a. 

His General People's Congress (GPC) has even threatened to not participate in response to the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), which in turn accuses the GPC of interfering with the Dialogue's formation.

"We say yes to Yemen National Dialogue but within the right framework, not as a parody," GPC member Ibrahim Sharaf was quoted as saying on Wednesday, despite the fact that Saleh's party received the most seats of any political bloc.

It's possible that the GCC and UNSC - meaning Riyadh and Washington - want more time to arrange a vacation for Saleh, as they did for Hadi's UN referendum in February 2012 (he returned to swear his VP in). However the likelihood of Saleh presiding over the National Dialogue's shadows remains too high for comfort. Only an exceedingly reckless move will turn UNSC threats of sanctions into reality, and sanctions aren't designed for accountability so much as control. As for the March 18th start date, The Trench is inquiring into the motivation behind this choice and hopes to obtain an answer soon.

One theory: Hadi intends to contrast the positives of his government with the negatives of Saleh's regime, possibly through a grand gesture to recognize Yemen's martyrs. However anything less than accountability lacks the power to satisfy revolutionaries who remain leery of the National Dialogue, and outright distrustful of the international community for favoring Saleh's regime.

“He has a lot of money that he uses to destroy Yemen, harm the political process and execute vengeance,” Nobel Laureate Tawwakol Karman recently told The Associated Press. “The political transition process is not going according to the mechanism set in the Gulf initiative, which was imposed on us and we accepted it only on the condition that it will be fully implemented."

She has suspended her participation in the National Dialogue until further notice.

The positions of various networks towards Yemen's dialogue underlines the geopolitical forces at work. Revolutionaries and tribal authorities disapprove of drones, believing that the immediate benefits of al-Qaeda casualties aren't worth the long-term risks to their sovereignty. They want the opportunity to combat AQAP themselves and have been marginalized instead due to their independence. The northern-based Houthis also want to join in theory but treat the process with entrenched skepticism. For years the sect waged an insurgency against Saleh's regime and Saudi forces (with U.S. assistance), pushing them to a stalemate, and Houthi leadership has trained their eyes on autonomy. Riyadh and Washington, however, reject this position and are extremely unpopular as a result.

The Southern Movement is idling in a similar position as the Houthis, looking to enter a dialogue with the central government as another state rather than a political party. UNSC powers also rejects this act of self-determination in favor of "unity" - the same word used by Saleh to justify his oppression of the south - to protect their own interests. The U.S. stands to lose control of its assets in South Yemen, including the drones parked at Al-Anad Air Base in Lahij province and the Special Forces training Yemeni personnel in the south, so unity is the only option available to the Southern Movement.

Washington and Riyadh prefer to stick a thorn in their side rather than aid their cause.

The U.S. media attention generated from civilian casualties misses the wider political interference transmitted by drones and their logistics in Yemen. Keeping drones operational and maintaining U.S. hegemony entails the alienation of the same populations that the Obama administration claims to support in their fight against AQAP.

UN Face Masks US-Saudi Counterrevolution In Yemen

Yemenis march against Saleh's immunity agreement with the GCC and UNSC

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) recently landed a team in Yemen to assess the country's political situation and lend support to a planned National Dialogue, which has been delayed several times since its scheduled opening in November 2012. The busy delegation would hold its own council with many of Yemen's political actors, including President Abd Mansur Rabbo Hadi's transitional government, the country's Military Committee and National Dialogue Technical Committee, and representatives of the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) and oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).

"We believe that President Hadi's leadership has been instrumental in driving forward the reforms necessary to make Yemen a more stable and prosperous country," British representative Mark Lyall Grant said as foreign sponsors met to discuss the progress of the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) power-sharing agreement.

The UN's representatives surely arrived in Sana'a with good intentions to aide Yemenis during a time of crisis and hardship. Assisting their new president has become the pillar of international efforts to prevent civil strife between Yemen's array of political actors, re-energize the country's crippled economy, and roll back the influence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). To his credit Hadi has performed beyond expectations in his quest to achieve independence from his former boss, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and is gradually nudging the dictator's relatives out of their political and military positions. Without Hadi's perceived neutrality, Yemen's diverse set of actors would struggle to find an individual capable of guiding the country through a National Dialogue.

However this same earnestness doesn't apply to the powers that these individuals represent, and rarely has a UN mission been dominated by so few powers. In reality the UNSC is minimally involved with Yemen's crisis. The political transition that its officials speak of originated in the back-channels of U.S.-Saudi relations, conceived with the intention of salvaging the useful remains of Saleh's regime and the influence they amassed within Yemen's government. The GCC's power-sharing deal was initially crafted by U.S. and Saudi diplomats in conjunction with Saleh's GPC and the equally unpopular JMP, as a means of splitting power amongst themselves.

Left out of the equation were the civil revolutionaries that forced Washington and Riyadh to intervene against their cause of a sovereign Yemen.

This private agreement was eventually passed along to the GCC itself and signed by Saleh in Riyadh, far from Yemen's street demonstrations, before undergoing final ratification in the UNSC. Unlike in Syria or Libya's geopolitical war zones, the UNSC's five permanent members had already unified around the U.S.-Saudi position in Yemen and approved the measure unanimously, adding the final veneer of international law to the GCC's "initiative." Among those conditions endorsed by the UNSC: immunity for Saleh and his family, the powers responsible for mismanaging Yemen and attempting to violently suppress the country's revolution.

UN officials have argued otherwise at infrequent points, claiming that those responsible for human rights abuses should face justice, but that argument invalidates itself. UNSC Resolution 2014 accepts the GCC initiative and all of its conditions as the basis of the UN-sponsored "political transition," a term used by foreign officials in lieu of revolution. While Resolution 2014 "stresses that all those responsible for violence, human rights violations and abuses should be held accountable," its legal wording is theoretical rather than practical - Saleh and his crew "should" or "must" be held accountable, but they won't be. Instead UN and U.S. officials surface on occasion to remind certain "spoilers" that sanctions could be levied on them, but only if they don't obey the powers in control of Yemen's transition. The strongman and his relatives possess too much information on U.S. and Saudi to see an international court or endure Western-Gulf sanctions.

Coordinating their actions with the UN's, Yemenis rallied over the weekend to hammer their objective into diplomatic minds and repeat their demands to prosecute Saleh for crimes against humanity.

A letter written by Yemen's Nobel Laureate, Tawakkol Karman, delivered the following message to the UNSC's delegation: "Though the GCC-brokered deal, its implementation mechanism and UN Security Council resolutions envisaged the departure of Saleh and his family from power and politics in general, and despite the fact the deal has granted him immunity from prosecution, Saleh is still leading the General People's Congress (GPC) to take revenge at the political and public life in Yemen. Our people and great youth are waiting for your resolutions to openly bind Saleh not only to step aside as the chairman of the GPC, but also to quit politics once and for all, or else the transition will either fail or stall at best."

To this end Karman has urged Hadi to quit Saleh's GPC and form an independent party.

The Saleh family's immunity isn't the GCC and UNSC's only transgression. These blocs conveniently arranged for Hadi to replace his boss after serving for nearly 18 years as his vice president, a suspect trade-off in itself. After being selected by foreign powers to maintain their relationships, Hadi was then "elected" by a single-candidate referendum and tasked to lead the country through a two-year political transition, culminating in true elections in 2014. This policy continues to carry its positives and negatives into the future, as Hadi has utilized every ounce of strength and intelligence to hold the country together. Problematically, he also serves as an obvious tool of Washington and Riyadh, and has opened the skies to U.S. drones in an effort to secure influence with the Obama administration.

The controlled transition that is supposed to prevent civil war serves a double purpose of maintaining Yemen's status quo.

Yemen's National Dialogue has also been delayed for multiple reasons and, in the best case scenario, won't be held until months after its original date. On one hand a conference of this magnitude cannot begin until positive conditions are established, but a handful of delays could impact future electoral time-lines and reform policies. The main cited problem is the exclusion (or inclusion, depending on the viewpoint) of Yemen's Southern Movement, whose split leadership cautiously approached the process and has yet to make a final decision. UN and GCC officials have spent most of their energy trying to secure the South's participation, and for good reason since a National Dialogue goes nowhere with half of a country. Except the UNSC's position is determined by powers that oppose South Yemen's secession and refuse to allow self-determination; among the motivating factors is a loss of control over al-Qaeda's sanctuaries in the south.

UNSC Resolution 2014 begins by, "Reaffirming its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen." Responding to the UNSC's delegation, protesters gathered in the southern port of Aden to reject its coercion and chant, "The decision is ours."

Additionally, the JMP has publicly refused to participate in the National Dialogue if Saleh represents his GPC party, and the JMP in turn has interfered with the youth's efforts to be represented. The most seats went to Saleh's party, Southerners and JMP - in that order - leaving the youth and women's movements with leftover crumbs (60 combined seats out of 565). As a result, Yemen's civil movement has encountered disagreements over how deeply to participate and receives little attention from the international community. The country's northern-based Houthi sect has remained similarly ambivalent about a National Dialogue; its thirst for autonomy mirrors the outright hunger in Yemen's south.

A national summit is badly needed and clearly preferable to violence, but its current state is likely to inflame tensions and divisions rather than alleviate them. Yemenis must also be left to their own choices rather than be forced by foreign hands.

Yemen's present situation combines the local dilemmas of sharing power with the international dilemma of hoarding influence, and cannot move forward until numerous preconditions are established. Otherwise a dialogue stands a high chance of collapsing or becoming irreparably corrupted by self-interests (think Bahrain), at which point Yemen will continue along a dangerous course until 2014's wildcard elections. According to UNSC Resolution 2014, the implementation of the GCC's power-sharing agreement "is essential for an inclusive, orderly, and Yemeni-led process of political transition." Unfortunately this statement fails to conform with reality or else the whole initiative would be altered - or it may not exist to begin with.

Until Washington, Riyadh and their proxies elevate sovereignty to the top of Yemen's agenda, long-term hegemony will cast a destabilizing shadow over the country's future.

AQAP, U.S. Drones Compete For Unpopularity In Yemen

As if to prove to any lingering doubters (few exist) that the Obama administration is going big into Yemen in pursuit of al-Qaeda in the Arabia (AQAP), between two and four drone strikes were conducted on Saturday night in Mareb governorate - the latter would be a 24-hour record. The bombings occurred in the Abedah valley near Wadi Abida, suggesting that a meeting was about to take place or had just taken place. A modest total of nine casualties have been reported, with varying accounts of their identification. Yemen's Defense Ministry recorded the destruction of two vehicles carrying AQAP suspects; local media has reported various AQAP-related deaths, at least one of them a Saudi national.

Estimating the total damage caused by drones is inherently challenging due to diverging local accounts, misreporting and media bias. Governments also cooperate or disagree with the U.S. (Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia) when denying civilian casualties or inflating militant kills. In short, every factor is preconditioned to obscure the truth.

Today's public outrage was immediate regardless of the collateral damage, hitting Yemen's local media and social networks hours before Marib's strikes reached the international press. Angry at their own government's inability to confront AQAP without foreign assistance, at the White House and House of Suad for interfering with their land, and at the lies told to cover up civilian casualties, Yemenis are stuck in a vicious catch 22: their current government and military lack the independent strength needed to reverse AQAP's influence, but the U.S. drones that temporarily fill this need are undermining the Yemeni government's own credibility with its people.

Wadi Abida is the same town that witnessed the droning of Jaber al-Shabwani, deputy governor of Marib. This episode opened a brief rift between Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen's former dictator, and the U.S. officials (David Petraeus and John Brennan) that received his approval to begin systematically bombing Yemen. Saleh's former vice president, Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi, is now overseeing an escalation of this policy after the Obama administration and Saudi Arabia successfully installed Hadi as Yemen's transitional president.

The ongoing debate of whether drones bring more long-term risk than short-term reward  has yet to impede the Obama administration's escalation in Yemen, where the dual priorities of political and military hegemony overrule the immediate need for popular support. A large amount of today's condemnation was directed against John Brennan, President Barack Obama's nominee to replace Petraeus as CIA Director. This continuity is especially pronounced in Yemen, as Petraeus and Brennan handled Saleh's profile prior to the country's revolution and lobbied to fund the same "counter-terrorism" forces that have attacked Yemeni protesters, Southerners and Houthi members. 

The Obama administration continues to maintain ignorance of Brennan and U.S. Ambassador Gerald Feierstein's unpopularity - concrete evidence that U.S. policy has no intention of building sincere relations with Yemen's people.

How the U.S. and Yemeni governments are supposed to defeat AQAP's influence with this strategy has never been fully explained. Few U.S. officials are willing to address the specific effects of drones and U.S. policy in Yemen, and Washington's "commitment to supporting Yemen during its historic transition" hinges solely on self-interests, a policy that perpetuates guerrilla warfare. Luckily renewed focus is being driven onto this counter-productively as Brennan nears his confirmation hearing on February 7th, but popular appeals and collateral damage won't sway U.S. policymakers.

The final outcome will present a vivid contrast of reality - the Senate welcoming Brennan's rise and Yemenis wishing for his fall.

U.S. Interference Spoiling Yemen's Revolution

Yemen's new President, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, established working relations with John Brennan while serving as vice president to Ali Abdullah Saleh

The latest military restructuring announced by Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi brought much-needed relief to an anxious nation. Beyond establishing new regional commands to increase the Defense Ministry's centralization, Hadi's decrees finally terminated several high-ranking relatives of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, namely his son Ahmed and nephew Yahya. Yemenis had demanded their dismissal from Saleh's personal "counter-terrorism" units since launching a revolution in January 2011, and both would assume instrumental roles in spearheading Saleh's vicious crackdown on peaceful demonstrators.

Gone, too, is the First Armored Division commanded by rogue general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who defected from Saleh's government in March 2011 to escape punishment and pursue his own interests. His division and Ahmed Saleh's Republican Guard now count themselves as part of Yemen's Special Operations Command and Strategic Reserve Forces, and theoretically fall under Hadi's personal authority.

This news was lauded by John Brennan, the Obama administration's counter-terrorism coordinator (and current nominee for CIA Director): "Mr. Brennan extended President Obama’s congratulations to President Hadi for the decrees issued yesterday to further restructure the Yemeni armed forces, advancing the goal of a unified, professional military that serves the Yemeni people."

Unfortunately the jubilant air soon cleared and Yemen's situation has tumbled back downhill in the days since. Following their "removal," the normally resistant Salehs welcomed Hadi's announcement and pledged to cooperate fully, triggering immediate suspicion of their payoffs. Ali Mohsen greeted Hadi's orders as though they had nothing to do with him. Reports then surfaced to explain their reactions - new military appointments - and were half-confirmed by the spokesman of Yemen's embassy in Washington; Mohammed Albasha announced on December 23rd that “there are no restrictions to their reappointments in the Ministry of Defense."

Subsequent reports predict that Hadi's decrees could take six months to implement, and that Ahmed Saleh and Ali Mohsen will continue to oversee their positions until then. If they do receive new regional commands or advisory positions, they can thank their ongoing survival for the immunity granted by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

These collective actions serve more private interests than Yemen's people, beginning with Hadi's interim government and the foreign powers that secured his promotion. Although he has admirably stepped up to fill Saleh's void after serving nearly two decades as his vice president, Hadi remains a controllable instrument of the GCC deal's true brokers, Riyadh and Washington. That leaves Yemen's revolutionaries - the country's future - at the bottom of national and international priorities, at a time when they have enough interference to deal with at home. Out-resourced by the oppositional Islah party, which dips its hands into most of Yemen's political movements, the country's civil parties have already been isolated in the UN-sponsored National Dialogue with few seats relative to the whole (the youth and women received 60 combined seats out of 565).

They could easily be squashed by Saleh's own General People's Congress (GPC) and the 112 delegates they plan to sit - the most of any bloc.

As of now the Islah-dominated Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), in addition to the youth, refuses to participate in the event that Saleh does represent his party (another "medical leave" is being planned by Riyadh and Washington, but both rumor and reality are fraught with uncertainties). Conversely, Islah has interfered with efforts to organize an independent youth conference, a phenomenal idea to advance a democratic Yemen, while Ali Mohsen's loyalists have "protected" the youth by militarizing their square at Sana'a University. The general recently agreed to withdraw his forces following persistent demonstrations against their presence, but only after months of physical altercations with the youth camps.

Yemen's youth and women are tragically viewed as groups to appease with scraps, not sources of national power to nurture and cooperate with. They have found few allies inside or outside the country due to their independent agenda, and cannot turn to the United States in their hour of need. The second incarnation of Yemen's Life March, a mobile demonstration traveling from the revolutionary hub of Ta'izz in December 2011 en route to Sana'a, recently arrived in the capital to remind Hadi and his foreign backers that they won't back down either. With no action taken by their transitional government or the UNSC, Yemenis once again marched to advocate their standing demands: "Dismissal of all military leaders who worked with Saleh, headed by Ahmad Ali Saleh, Ali Mohsen Saleh, Ghalib Algamesh and fully dismissing them and not reshuffling their positions in the new appointments, whatever the circumstances."

The march ended when government forces blocked its path and violently dispersed protesters with tear gas, eroding another piece of the goodwill initially earned by Hadi's military shakeup.

U.S. influence is hardly responsible for all of Yemen's politico-economic dilemmas and the tribal knots created by Saleh's nepotism. However the sheer gravity of America's counter-terrorism is warping Yemen's political and military reforms. The Obama administration no longer has practical use for Saleh and company, but they possess too much incriminating evidence on Saudi and U.S. actions in Yemen to be cast away completely. Instead Saleh has been kept close, traveling to America twice since the revolution began, and silent under the GCC's immunity package. Potential sanctions against "spoilers" - the always unnamed Saleh - remain a manipulative tool to avoid accountability.

In the meantime U.S. drones continue to strike at suspected targets of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), accumulating enough collateral damage to produce a bombshell report by The Washington Post. Hadi has opened a wider door than his predecessor in exchange for U.S. and Saudi support, approving the Obama administration's covert activities and moving to kill inquiries into civilian casualties. This relationship-building and the preservation of mutual interests is more responsible for Hadi's decrees than any genuine effort to uproot Saleh's regime from Yemen's political equation.

Ultimately, Ali Abdullah Saleh cannot be held accountable for decades of misrule because the U.S. and Yemen's power-sharing government are working outside the bounds of accountability. The fact that Washington and Riyadh have exhausted their operational need for his regime is far from stabilizing, and poses an enhanced threat to Yemen's democratic growth. One can reasonably assume that Washington will possess greater influence over Hadi's Special Operations Command than Saleh's U.S.-trained units. Counter-terrorism activities are being established in systematic fashion - land, sea and air forces surround the peninsula nation - but U.S. policy as a whole represents counterinsurgency at its worse: deep hostility and mistrust with the local population.

The Obama administration cannot realistically expect to defeat AQAP with its current strategy, and the same power that lifted Hadi to his current position is weighing him down with his own people.

"The main problem is not only with the US administration - extrajudicial killings in Yemen of 'suspected' targets, killing and terrorizing civilians and creating animosity towards the US - but rather with our government’s position, approving those drone strikes," says Noon Arabia, a Yemeni-Egyptian blogger who maintains her anonymity for personal and security reasons. "Former president Saleh with all his shortcomings tried to hide his role in allowing the US drones to strike in Yemen, before being exposed by Wikileaks. However his predecessor President Hadi not only publicly endorsed them, he even argued regarding their accuracy. Drone strikes in Pakistan decreased by 41% in 2011 and another 40% in 2012 because the Pakistani government publicly condemned and disapproved of them. Yet in Yemen they have increased by 240% in 2011, and another 250% in 2012 and most likely will increase further in 2013 thanks to our puppet government."

Yemen's revolutionaries are marching, bleeding and dying for a better future than what is currently being forced onto them. The U.S. would be wise to begin a new era of engagement and vanquish the same fear that is normally reserved for al-Qaeda.

Brennan Dons CIA's Death Mask In Yemen

Brennan maintained cordial relations with dictator Ali Saleh until he became less useful than his vice president 

As the majority of Washington's political and media establishment concentrate their firepower on Senator Chuck Hagel's nomination for Defense Secretary, John Brennan is doing what he does best and slipping through the shadows. Rumored since President Barack Obama secured his second term in office, Brennan has finally received a formal nomination to replace the scandalized David Petraeus and improve upon his work at the CIA. Disturbingly but not surprisingly, many American pundits have welcomed Brennan's promotion as a solid choice for the CIA's Directorship and expect a majority confirmation. 

They generally avoid real discussions over the areas of operations affected (and afflicted) by U.S. counter-terrorism, instead preferring the glamorous statistics of high-profile kills and Brennan's alleged construction of a "legal framework" for drones - as recently claimed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY).

Brennan's positives are easy to list: "More al Qaeda leaders and commanders have been removed from the battlefield than at any time since 9/11." He has applied his extensive influence to “literally building" and leading the National Counterterrorism Center, which entailed the coordination of various military, intelligence and civilian departments across the globe. In the process Brennan has become one of Obama's most trusted advisors, so close that, “I don’t think we’ve had a disagreement.”

"For the last four years," Obama announced from the East Room, "as my Advisor for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, John developed and has overseen our comprehensive counterterrorism strategy - a collaborative effort across the government, including intelligence and defense and homeland security, and law enforcement agencies."

However this fantasy hits a steel wall in Yemen, where Brennan and U.S. Ambassador Gerald Feierstein may be the most despised Americans to touch its soil. The immediate reaction to Brennan's promotion has been universally negative for good reason, as he reinforces the single-mindedness and unaccountability that drives an assortment of U.S. counterterrorism platforms being constructed around the nation. Brennan now picks up  Petraeus's "secret" agreement with Yemen's former dictator, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and was even deployed to Sana'a on multiple occasions during the country's ongoing revolution; he would assist Feierstein in facilitating the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) unpopular power-sharing agreement when a drone strike didn't require overseeing.

Brennan told the Wilson Center in April 2012, "Yemen was fortunate that they do - did have a degree of political pluralism there, Ali Abdullah Saleh in fact allowed certain political institutions to develop, and we were very fortunate to have a peaceful transition from the previous regime to the government of President Hadi now."

A known intimate of Saudi Arabia's royal circle, Brennan's promotion also corresponds to recent investigative reporting on Saudi bombings in Yemen. Now he's promoted a week later, highlighting the obvious favoritism and imperialism that assisted his rise atop the CIA.

Given that Brennan has been nominated, in part, to embed the CIA deeper into Yemen, his presence is ultimately counterproductive to defeating al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and improving relations with Yemen's people. "Traveling through the Arabian Peninsula where he camped with tribesmen in the desert" has done little to promote their human rights and dignity, which are trampled on daily by the national government and its foreign partners. Victims of drone strikes have no recourse, and Yemen's revolution has been blocked by opportunistic relations with the ruling General People's Congress (GP) and oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).

Washington's Pakistani "model" has been improved by establishing better relations with the transitional government, led by Saleh's former VP Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, but the exact same hostility is repeating within those who serve as the real front lines against AQAP.

A "keen understanding of a dynamic world" has also been absent from Yemen's counterterrorism operations. During a prolonged defense of the CIA's targeted killings, orchestrated throughout 2012 and Yemen's emerging bombardment, Brennan claimed that drones don't cause as much resentment as commonly believed. He never acknowledged a revolution amid the Obama administration's micromanaging of a "political crisis," and has no relationship with the people that are needed to stop AQAP at its roots. He's even been known to claim that drones don't kill any civilians, or else very few.

What Brennan will ensure is that AQAP's status remains healthy, and that Yemen remains under the firm grip of Washington and Riyadh.

To overrule these "results," as Obama calls them, flattery and hyperbole is piled onto Brennan's shoulders in an effort to democratize him, so to speak. Instead of a calculated killer that has taken his share of civilian life, Brennan is heralded as a "legendary, tireless patriot" and a model of American "integrity." Ethics and values are stressed as a counterweight to the perceived constitutional violations that drone warfare entails.

"There’s another reason I value John so much, and that is his integrity and his commitment to the values that define us as Americans. He has worked to embed our efforts in a strong legal framework. He understands we are a nation of laws. In moments of debate and decision, he asks the tough question and he insists on high and rigorous standards. Time and again, he’s spoken to the American people about our counterterrorism policies because he recognizes we have a responsibility to be [as] open and transparent as possible."

The SDNY recently refused to address the killing of 16-year old U.S. citizen Abdulahman al-Awlaki, son of Anwar al-Awlaki, on the grounds that the Obama administration never released any information on his killing. Unlike his father, whose droned body was held up as a trophy by Brennan and company, Abdulrahman's murder was first denied, then silenced and finally labeled an "outrageous mistake" by an anonymous official over a year later.

His or her statements occurred within a glowing profile of the CIA veteran.

Brennan was incapable of bringing a shred of peace to Yemen as Obama's counterterrorism advisor and remains helpless at the CIA - he can only deliver death and destruction. His tireless drone fleet will always kill civilians in between terrorists and the process will stay classified to Americans and Yemenis alike. The Predator and its sole purpose of killing serves as a permanent symbol of U.S. imperialism, and lacks the ability to build relationships at the local level. Mere flyovers cause terror. This policy violates America's morals, the spirit of the Nobel and the strategic essence of counterinsurgency all at once. A plan that fails to kill more militants than it creates doesn't qualify for counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency - expedient recklessness is a more accurate definition.

"What scares me about drone strikes is how they are perceived around the world," retired general Stanley McCrystal told Reuters in a new interview, coincidentally implicating Brennan himself. "The resentment created by American use of unmanned strikes ... is much greater than the average American appreciates. They are hated on a visceral level, even by people who've never seen one or seen the effects of one."

Until U.S. policy undergoes a radical shift in fundamentals, a change unlikely to occur under Brennan, America has already lost its small war in Yemen.

U.S. and Bahrain: Oppressive Allies Think Alike

In a predictably totalitarian move that threatens the regime itself in the long-term, Bahrain's court system has finally buried the appeals process for 13 oppositional activist accused of plotting to overthrow the government. The decision culminates months of legal warfare with King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa's army of legal soldiers, but this illusionary battle never offered a chance to the political prisoners trapped in the monarchy's web. Last month an appeals court knocked one year off Nabeel Rajab's three-year sentence in the vain appearance of fairness. 

Now his partner at the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, has been sentenced once and for all to life, while his daughter faces nearly a dozen charges herself for protesting peacefully (and often in solitude). Several of al-Khawaja's fellow defendants were accused of plotting an Iranian coup.

The BCHR concluded: 

Thus it is clear inconsistencies numerous and large among its ruling the Court of Appeal supported the provisions of the courts of national safety, and what came in the report of BICI of the observations and conclusions which lead that all that the defendants in this case have not only exercised their fundamental freedoms in the regulation and expression, peaceful assembly but they were subjected to serious abuses during their arrest, detention and trial.

As is evident the Court did not respond to the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry to investigate violations and to prosecute those involved. As is evident synergies of the Constitutional Court and the criminal courts and public prosecution and continuation in the previous approach, making this issue a stark example of the lack of independence of the judiciary in Bahrain, and lack of seriousness in implementing the recommendations of the fact-finding committee.

The rapid nature of news and social media has produced numerous observations to the effect that Bahrain's monarchy "has shown its true colors" - or "pushed the country closer to the brink" - and that its Western allies will be unable to defends its actions. The first two general reactions are inaccurate but partially true. King Hamad's royal circle has demonstrated their inability to redress Bahrain's crisis since the uprising began, making the wrong choice with Saudi Arabia's Peninsula Shield and never looking back from the destruction of Pearl Monument. Aside from a successful propaganda campaign with Western governments and skillful use of low-intensity violence, Bahrain's monarchy has made strategic errors at every turn - if its goal is the resolution of a fundamental political dispute.

Otherwise the monarchy is succeeding wildly in its attempt to provoke and crack down on the island's Shia majority.

Sentencing the opposition's leadership to life in prison sentences the regime itself to permanent unrest. Accordingly, Bahrain has already reached the brink and descended into a canyon of tyrannical abuse and sectarian tensions. Monday's sentencing is simply a new feature in this dangerous environment, and will produce new waves of oppositional action in the streets and at the party level. Protests will occur, counterassaults will follow, and the island will continue spinning out of control until Bahrain's king decides to be a good one - or is removed, internally or externally.

As for Hamad's Western support, particularly Washington and London, they spent last night trying to cover their pig in lipstick rather than formulate a genuine policy to support Bahrain's opposition. Repeated calls for dialogue have bounced off a hardening situation in the streets and prisons, and the modest criticism levied at calculated times has made no lasting effect when outweighed by statements of this type (also here and here). That U.S. policy is blowing in a chaotic wind is increasingly acknowledged by left and right, accepted even by The Washington Post, Wall Street Journal and Max Boot. Yet the same pattern of "concern" and "regret” that has failed to yield any positive change was on display Monday in the State Department.

"We regret today’s decision by the Bahraini Court of Cassation to uphold the convictions and the sentences of these 13 activists. We’re concerned that this decision further restricts freedom of expression and compromises the atmosphere within Bahrain for reconciliation. We have repeatedly voiced our concern about these cases both publicly and privately and at the highest levels, and urged the Government of Bahrain to abide by its international obligations, and we have also had Embassy observers at the trial. So we call on the Government of Bahrain to investigate all reports of torture, including those made by the defendants in this case, as it has pledged to do, and to hold accountable any who are found responsible."

The "atmosphere within Bahrain for reconciliation" is already compromised. Conversely, Western "concern" and naked abuse is regularly heaped on the opposition's use of violence in a systematic effort to disguise the all-consuming reality: involved governments are too busy pursuing their own interests to responsibly address Bahrain's full-spectrum crisis.

They refuse to believe that anyone can stop them and dare the people to prove them wrong.

Yemenis Walled In By National, U.S. Courts

On Wednesday the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) dismissed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit (FIOA) initiated by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The ACLU had requested government records of Anwar Al-Awlaki, Abdulrahman al-Alwaki and Samir Khan's "targeted killings," but the SDNY predictably struck down an inquiry into the explanation of their deaths - citing the Obama administration's own defense of drones as sufficient reason not to disclose their operations.

The Trench is less interested in becoming mired in al-Awlaki's case, and the questions of whether he constituted an imminent threat and qualified for treason. The U.S.-born preacher had urged jihadists to attack the U.S. homeland and will never win a legal battle regarding his citizenship. Khan's involvement with Inspire magazine, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) main propaganda outlet, also leaves no alternatives for a U.S. court. Two overarching debates were heard by the FIOA's end: the constitutional legality of targeted assassinations against U.S. citizens, and whether the U.S. public has a right to transparency.

These issues, though obviously vital to America's health and privacy, ignore another fundamental and interconnected dilemma: U.S. counter-terrorism is making more opponents in Yemen.

In the aftermath of al-Awkali's death, which triggered a miniature replica of Osama bin Laden's killing, the Obama administration readily manipulated a "brand name" to justify an ongoing militarization of the country - a plan that the American majority remains indifferent to. By branding him as the leader or else a high-ranking strategist of AQAP (a ploy that just repeated today), the White House failed to correct exaggerations of his importance in the U.S. mainstream media. Al-Awlaki did run with the group's core and considered himself a planner, preacher and propagandist, but he was far from AQAP's most valuable figure. He's probably more valuable dead, and AQAP has continued to grow its organization in his absence.

A U.S. court of law naturally takes minimal interests in these transgressions.

Of greater concern to The Trench is the blatantly unlawful assassination of al-Awlaki's 16-year old son, Abdulrahman, to be treated in depth shortly. Droned three weeks later at a barbecue without the fanfare of his father, the Denver-born Abdulrahman was unassociated with his father's radical teachings and killed without committing a crime. This heinous act was recognized as such by the Obama administration's own coverup; Abdulrahman's killing has yet to be formally addressed directly, and only recently admitted indirectly by anonymous U.S. officials.

His death was excused as "an outrageous mistake" in a Washington Post report that "coincidentally" glorify John Brennan's "true model" of counter-terrorism in Yemen.

Due to ambiguity and denial, the court ruled out the release of his records because no admission was made by the Obama administration. Gross perversity of circular logic is difficult to explain: because the White House didn't talk about a murder it committed, America's courts can't either. The ultimate tragedy of Abdulrahman being erased from the SDNY's ruling, beyond his personal suffering and his family's irreplaceable loss, is how Abdulrahman represents the average Yemeni plight. Few to no Yemeni-Americans are plotting within AQAP to bring down America, while millions of Yemenis live and sleep under drone patrols, and they can't count on either government for protection or accountability.

Yemen's transitional government remains under a heavy American arm and has blocked numerous investigations into civilian casualties, overburdening the remnants of Ali Abdullah Saleh's legal system. Meanwhile the U.S. court system is unlikely to provide any recourse to Yemenis or Yemeni-Americans who become victims of America's escalating war with AQAP.

This policy generates no possibility of improving American relations with Yemen's people - the key to defeating AQAP - and smothers all light of justice.

Basic Anatomy of U.S. Propaganda In Yemen

Importing news from Yemen to the American populace is similar to taking candy from a baby. Ignorance opens a wide gate to all sorts of transgressions in the so-called "War on Terror," and Saturday's drone strike in Al Bayda' Governorate demonstrated how easily information can be manipulated without consequence. The Associated Press soon reports that a missile strike on a Land Cruiser killed "three suspected militants" in el-Manaseh village, located near Rada'a.

"Their bodies were charred and the car was completely obliterated," a tribesman told Reuters from the scene. "Their bodies were not recognizable, but the government says they're from al Qaeda."

Of course that's often the story of Yemeni officials with a vested interest in keeping U.S. operations and President Abd Mansur Rabo Hadi's complicity under wraps. Yemenis hold an extremely low opinion of the government's credibility as a result of past and present obscurity; the U.S. and international news cycle is currently dominated (however briefly) by anti-drone sentiments. Yemen's Ministry of Defense claimed that local al-Qaeda commander Saleh Mohammed al-Amiri, but one tribal official told al-Alhmardar that the victims were civilians. 22-year old Abdul Wahid al-Amiri and 11-year old Salim Mohammed al-Amiri were named as the casualties, with the discrepancy of the third victim going unexplained.

The anonymous tribal figure said he plans to take the bodies to Rada'a and demand an explanation from the government.

Problematically, investigations into civilian casualties have already been obstructed by Hadi's interim government at the Obama administration's request. Information regarding the operational nature of each strike - whether the ordnance was fired by U.S. or Yemeni forces - has also been blurred to the point that an accurate count doesn't exist. Estimates vary between 41 and 54 confirmed U.S. air-strikes in 2012, with the AP publishing the Long War Journal's low count. Rough counts of alleged U.S. strikes since 2002 have climbed high above 100, and the ratio between civilian and militant casualties has been lost in the shadowy, meaning-grinding process of counter-terrorism.

It's safe to assume that more Yemeni civilians have been killed than either government admits. Rada'a has witnessed multiple drone strikes of a questionable nature and at least one open slaughter of civilians; anonymous U.S. officials finally admitted to the attack earlier this month after previously letting Yemeni fighter planes take the blame. Hadi would visit Washington three weeks afterward to laud the use of drones, telling the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, "They pinpoint the target and have zero margin of error, if you know what target you're aiming at."

He must have already known that the U.S. didn't.

The strike in al-Manaseh will likely endure a similarly nebulous fate, but the political costs for Hadi will continue to rise as well. The only certainty surrounding U.S. covert activities is his authorization and Yemenis are growing increasingly disenchanted by his subservience to Washington - and how they are paying the price of his promotion with their lives. Over time this unpopularity will transfer to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) bank. As one survivor infamously told The Washington Post, “Our entire village is angry at the government and the Americans."

True counterinsurgency is impossible to apply in these conditions, especially by robotic birds.

U.S. propaganda continues to thicken in Rada'a, where the AP reports that several hundred AQAP gunmen stormed the city in January 2012 after a "security lapse." Yemen's former dictator and current warlord, Ali Abdullah Saleh, used such "lapses" as a tool to foment chaos in the south and keep himself useful to the U.S. (and keep the U.S. busy with AQAP). Although not cooperating directly with AQAP figure Tariq al Dhahab, a brother-in-law of drone victim Anwar al-Awlaki, eyewitnesses reported the same lack of government resistance that marked Jaar and Zinjibar's "takeovers" in Abyan governorate. None of this backstory was reported.

Instead, "AQAP overran entire towns and villages - including Radda - last year by taking advantage of a security lapse during nationwide protests that eventually ousted the country’s longtime ruler. Backed by the U.S. military, Yemen’s army was able to regain control of the southern region but al-Qaida militants continue to launch deadly attacks on security forces that have killed hundreds."

This version sounds far more competent than the Obama administration's policy of initially backing Saleh, making his replacement unpopular, alienating a new generation of Yemenis, opposing their peaceful revolution, militarizing their country and watching AQAP grow its ranks.

Lastly, the AP reports that "an infantry brigade in the northeastern province of Marib to stop armed tribesmen who maintain cordial ties with al-Qaida from attacking oil pipelines and power generating stations, as well as to counter al-Qaida militants." Separately, a tribal source told AFP that Salah bin Hussein al-Dammaj is responsible for the recent attacks, and that he demands "100 million riyals ($480,000) in compensation for land he claims was taken from him in Sanaa." Many possibilities could explain his dispute with in the capital, one of them being with Saleh himself. Yemenis believe that he has orchestrated these attacks in response to his gradual loss of power, or else his tribal contacts now left hanging are committing their own retaliation.

The AP wrote mere days ago, after another U.S. strike, that "some tribal chiefs are also suspected of being allied with former longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The attacks appeared to be aimed at undermining the new government."

This information was placed at the report's very bottom - now it's completely gone.