Tech Talk - Falling gas prices and Iraq

Filling up at the local gas station yesterday I noted that prices are still below $3.00 a gallon, though at $2.99 only just below. Going back to the BBC Calculator this is still $2.04 less per tank than the regional average, and $86 less than I would pay in Italy. So even though the costs are rising over the last time I looked, they are still relatively low.

Figure 1. Relative fuel costs ($/gal) in different locations around the world. (BBC Calculator)

The orange line in figure 1 shows what I paid, and the darker grey horizontal line the regional cost here in the MidWest.

The EIA have noted in last week’s TWIP that the national price is as low as it has been since the beginning of 2011.

Figure 2. Average US retail prices for gasoline (EIA).

The EIA continues to describe the causes of these relatively low prices:

Lower global crude oil prices, high profitability for diesel fuel that has been encouraging refiners to increase throughput, high inventories, and the switch to less-costly winter grades of gasoline are among the factors currently driving gasoline prices.

The OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR) reports that global oil prices have fallen $2.04 a barrel (to $106.69) – the first decline in five months, as stocks increase and the Northern Hemisphere moves into winter. The estimate for global demand growth this year remains at 0.9 mbd, with the growth for next year anticipated to be at 1.04 mbd. This steady growth in global demand of a million barrels a day keeps raising the question as to where the increase is likely to come from. This is particularly germane given the disturbed conditions in a number of the MENA countries that provide a significant amount of baseline production, as well as anticipated increases.

The problems in Iraq, for example, have now reached the point that the Turkish government is directly working with the Kurds in Northern Iraq, to develop the oil in the Kurdish northern part of Iraq. This comes at a time that Iraq has been negotiating with the different major oil companies that had contracted to help Iraq reach an overall production target of 12 mbd by 2017. There have been considerable doubts cast on that original estimate, with the IEA producing a report, reviewed in an earlier post that concluded that the country would be lucky to achieve a production goal of 6 mbd by 2020, with an out year estimate that the country would be able to reach 8.3 mbd only by 2035.

Recognizing some of the difficulties in gearing up oil production at the different oilfields around Iraq (some of which were discussed in another post last June) production targets for 2017 had already been scaled back to a goal of 9 mbd by 2017, a drop of 25%. Now there has been discussion between Iraq and its partners for the various fields to drop those target values further, despite the large scale of the reserves that are considered available.

Figure 3. Oil reserves by field (Financial Times)

Exxon Mobil had 60% of the stake in the West Qurna oil field, but after it had started to work with the Kurds independently of Baghdad it found that relations with the Central Government rather chilled. Exxon Mobil has thus sold 25% of their stake to Petro China, and 10% to Pertamina of Indonesia, bringing the EM stake down to 25%. The current discussions between the companies and the Iraqi government are aimed at reducing the production target of the field by around 1 mbd..

Oil has just started to be produced at West Qurna Two, but the initial target is to have commercial production by the end of the year has suffered from local disruptions and the initial goal to reach a production of 400 kbd by the end of 2014 is now also in doubt. Commercial production is now not estimated to begin until perhaps the end of the first quarter of 2014. Initially the field was to be producing 1.9 mbd by 2017. That goal had been lowered to 1.2 mbd at the end of 2012. How the current disruptions will play into that target is difficult to estimate yet, but a year ago the parties were assuming that production would have already reached 150 kbd.

Earlier this year ENI had agreed with the Ministry of Oil to lower the target peak production from the Zubair field from 1.2 mbd to 850 kbd with that goal to be reached in 2016.

Discussions are not yet complete on new target production to be achieved from the Majnoon field. Shell has just announced the start of production from the field with the intent of raising production to over 175 kbd by the end of the year. However the long term target of raising production to 1.8 mbd is now in question. Shell is reportedly suggesting that the 2017 target be lowered to 1 mbd.

Similarly over at the Rumaila field BP is in discussion over long-term production, although earlier last month Schlumberger stopped work at the field because of local disturbances. With the field producing 1.4 mbd the disturbance was short-lived and is not reported to have affected current production, though it is indicative of tensions within the country. Current discussions are aimed at lowering the 2017 target production by around 800 kbd.

When these cuts are combined the total reduction is around 3.65 mbd, taking 2017 production down to 5.35 mbd, which is below the earlier best case scenario envisaged by the IEA.

OPEC notes that, after reaching a peak recent production of 3.194 mbd in August, production has fallen back below 3 mbd in September and October, and with Saudi Arabia also cutting back below 10 mbd in October the Organization is lowering production to meet the reduced winter demand, albeit the reduction from Iraq might not have been anticipated.

Figure 4. OPEC production figures through Oct 13, 2013 as reported by others to OPEC (OPEC MOMR )

This means, unfortunately, that if the world was anticipating that the roughly 4 mbd increase in global demand by 2017 would be met largely by increased oil production from Iraq then they are likely to be sadly disappointed. Enjoy the lower gas prices while you may.

Tech Talk - A Dickensian Situation revisited

Back in March 2005 I posted my first offering to the new site that Kyle and I had agreed to call “The Oil Drum.” Now, some eight years later, this will be my final Tech Talk to appear on that site, and it is perhaps appropriate to go back to that first post, and make a couple of comments on how it panned out. It read as follows:

When I was young I was fascinated by a small china statuette that my Grandparents had of Mr Micawber. He is a character, and a sympathetic one, in Charles Dickens's book "David Copperfield", in the course of which he goes into debt, His explanation of his financial condition can be compared to the coming world experience as we now live through Hubbert's Peak. You might, in today's phraseology, call this the Money quote:

'My other piece of advice, Copperfield,' said Mr. Micawber, 'you know. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen nineteen and six, result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery. The blossom is blighted, the leaf is withered, the god of day goes down upon the dreary scene, and - and in short you are for ever floored. As I am!'.

In this case consider that our expenses, i.e. the world use of oil, went up last year to around 83 million barrels every day (mbd). (A barrel is 42 gallons). Now as long as our supplies (income) can match this outlay then we are in happiness. This was, in relative terms, where we ended last year.

However this year our expenses are going to go up. It is a little difficult to predict exactly how much but current predictions are for this to be around 2 mbd. Let us equate this to the old English sixpence (which was back then worth about a dime. Twenty pounds being worth about $100).

If we follow the Micawber example if our income, world oil supply is equal to or greater than our expenses then we can stay happy. But here is the rub.

When world oil production is just about as high as it can be (non-OPEC countries are now producing just about as fast as they can) and OPEC spare capacity is down to around an additional 1.3 mbd. then our income this year will likely not be much above 85 mbd, if it gets there. (In a later post I will explain why it probably won't).

So we are at the point where within the next few months income and expenditures will be in balance (Micawber's twenty pounds). Except that the industry being a big one there are always things going wrong. In the latter part of last year for example we had:
• the hurricanes in the Gulf that closed down about 0.5 mbd of production for several months,
• oil production in Iraq, which should be around 3 mbd, but because of pipeline bombings etc dropped below 2 mbd,
• there were frequent threatened strikes on the oil platforms in Nigeria,
• and Russian production declined more drastically than had been anticipated.

Some of these are still with us, some have been resolved. And other problems, such as the complete employment of the world tanker fleet, have yet to make an impact. But any one can drop supply.

Yet while our supply (income) is about at a peak (twenty pounds), our expenses (demand) are still going up by this sixpence a year. So that some time this year expenses will have gone from twenty pounds to twenty pounds and sixpence. A number of economists had been predicting that there would be a reduction in the rise in demand to keep us below that figure, but it is already clear that they do not adequately recognize the considerable needs in China and India that drive this increase (and they only have to read the papers to see it).

The big question is when will we reach the point that we cross over the balance point. Right now with the Saudi Arabian government saying that they can increase production by up to 1.5 mbd one might think we could get through to just about the end of this year. Unfortunately some of us are a little cynical about that number, and I'll explain why in another post.

One final gloomy thought - production in other countries (such as the UK) is falling, and the countries that used that supply must find another source. And if we are now at the peak of production, then our income cannot increase above twenty pounds and and may indeed fall back below twenty pounds, while our expenses will continue to increase to twenty pounds and sixpence. It is not the absolute size of the market that will now drive, but the relatively small fluctuations that take us out of balance.

The result is misery, and we are for ever floored.

Looking around it is reasonable to note that we don’t see the level of misery that, from reading that post, one might have expected to happen. We have gone through a major recession, yet demand has, overall, increased and production has risen to meet that demand. Yet looking at how this has been met is instructive.

Figure 1. Changes in liquid supply sources from 2000 to 2040 as anticipated by Exxon Mobil, with lines added to show 2005 and 2013. (The Outlook for Energy: A view to 2040)

I have added lines to show the situation in 2005, when the piece was written, and for this year. It is worth noting that, using the definitions that Exxon Mobil give, conventional crude and condensate production has, indeed, declined since I wrote those words. And if one includes Oil Sand and Deepwater then production has remained fairly stable at the levels back in 2005, and will (according to EM) likely stay so into the projected future.

The three sources that I had underestimated, in terms of production growth were in Biofuels (which is now at around 2 mbd), the growth in Natural Gas Liquids (which for OPEC alone is now projected to reach 6 mbd by next year up from around 3 mbd in 2005, and the growth in tight oil. This latter development, particularly with the use of long horizontal wells that are artificially fractured and injected with a slick-water suspension of a proppant, has been very successful in developing resources which were otherwise at best marginally economic. However the relative contribution that this is expected to make in overall supply is not that great, and I expect that, because of the high decline rates in individual wells, that this will only contribute on the margin of the problem.

When I began writing at The Oil Drum I was concerned that there was a lack of understanding of the impact that reservoir decline rates would have on long-term supply. As larger fields are depleted, so the world turns to smaller fields and these drain more rapidly, so that more and more are needed. (The Red Queen situation that Rune Likvern and others have so aptly described.

Deepwater resources have proven to be more difficult to bring on line than originally estimated and thus, for example, in the case of Brazil OPEC now anticipates that the production from the Lula field (originally Tupi) will only offset declines from wells in the rest of the country, with perhaps only a gain of 10 kbd overall from the addition of the 100 kbd expected from wells now coming on line. And thus, while this is a resource getting more attention (there are expected to be 60 Deepwater rigs in the Gulf of Mexico by 2015) the slow pace of development may not fill the increasing gap left as conventional oil production continues to fall, as Exxon Mobil suggest.

In retrospect, therefore, I was wrong in anticipating a relatively immediate impact from an anticipated imbalance between oil supply and demand. But, within the time frame the price of oil has risen, and the future looks no happier than it did back in 2005. The threats have changed – we seem to be in a quiescent period for major Gulf Hurricanes, for e.g. – but the threat of growing and spreading turmoil in MENA makes it less certain that we can count on much increase in production from Iraq, among others. Russian production rebounded more than I expected, but whether that can be sustained is still in doubt. The hope, at the beginning, was that the threat would spur increased looks into alternate sources of liquid fuel. But while there was a flurry of activity into biofuels (and I myself saw algal work that held a great potential, - though funding has now disappeared for that effort) there is less of a feeling of urgency in the air. Wind and solar sources have reached a point where they are no longer novel, and there is not much else in the near term that holds much potential.

Oil production takes money and resources, but most critically it takes time. Without that investment, particularly in viable alternatives, the oil “income” (supply) will likely soon start to fall short of the oil “expenses” (demand) and as Mr. Micawber so aptly said “we are forever floored.”

When these posts began, technical blogs, such as TOD, posed the potential for mass education in a way that had not been seen before. Readers have been kind in regard to the quality of the posts themselves. But the contributions from those interested, and those in industry who took the time to comment and debate ended up making this much stronger than the initial words in any post. Expertise came in many forms and informed me as well as the rest of the readers in what turned into a wonderful opportunity for many people to understand some of the complexities of supplying the world with hydrocarbon energy. I was thus able to help bring a little understanding of the energy business to vastly more folk than I had in the entirety of my academic career.

I will always be grateful to Kyle for giving me the opportunity to make this contribution, and to his efforts which led to its great success. I can illustrate that with some numbers – as an academic I took persuasion to allow my class size to rise much above 20, and at Bit Tooth Energy I see about 300 readers on a typical good day – Kyle had us above that number in a very few months, and at its peak TOD was handling 200 times that number. The site would not have continued too long as it grew in size without the indefatigable SuperG, who kept the site up under wide ranging pressures, and took care of the technical side of the house. Leanan brought and kept us readers, and provided many of the topics that we needed to create the posts on site, and Gail kept me going with encouragement and support in more difficult times. Nate orchestrated the closing posts and that was not easy.

The folks Kyle brought in to build an international forum were formidable and highly productive, and so to them, and to all of the gentle readership I say again a heartfelt “Thank You!”

(Heading Out – Dave Summers in the mundane world – will continue to write Tech Talks at Bit Tooth Energy, though he writes on a wider range of topics at that site).

Tech Talk - Where to look for more oil this year.

The news that Saudi Arabia is planning to employ 200 drilling rigs next year (up from 20 back in 2005) suggests that there is a recognition that future reserves may not measure up to the planned volumes needed. Plans now include exploration of the shale deposits in the country, looking primarily for natural gas. There are estimates that this resource could run as high as 600 trillion cubic ft. Current plans are to drill seven exploratory wells in the Red Sea, off Tabuk.

Figure 1. Location of Tabuk in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (WikiMedia )

This is across the country from the major oil fields currently in use, which lie more along the Persian Gulf coast, centered perhaps around Damman. It therefore suggests that they are looking for extensions of the Israeli and Egyptian fields into northern KSA. (Minister Al-Naimi said that they still “had to find them.”)

In discussing the venture Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ali Al-Naimi also noted that, choosing to look for – and presumably finding - natural gas, would take the pressure off the country to maintain its oil reserve.

Al-Naimi said that prospects for global production of shale gas and oil – including in China, Ukraine, Poland and Saudi Arabia – were so promising that the Kingdom might not need to continue with its decades-long policy of maintaining an oil-output cushion for use in global supply disruptions.
“It is not a question whether Saudi Arabia has spare (oil) capacity. It is a question of whether we need to spend billions maintaining it at all,” Al-Naimi said.

Now over the years KSA has lowered the volume it has projected that it can produce from 12.5 mbd to 12 mbd, and this is, perhaps, an early indication that they intend (whether by policy or natural reserve availability) to lower that maximum further.

This has to be of at least a little concern, since the number of places with significant flexibility to increase production are getting closer to zero every year. The gains in global production that are foreseen by OPEC in the next year, for example come in dribs and drabs.

OPEC notes that in May the 8,915 producing wells in North Dakota collectively produced over 800 kbd. (The Department of Mineral Resources reports 821 kbd in June, over the 811 kbd in May with well numbers of 8,932 in May and 9,071 in June. Production per well is thus running an average of 90 barrels a day, with a well cost of $9 million.) There are 187 rigs plus/minus working and this is still enough to keep production rising at a rate of 1.3% per month. One of the maps I find interesting is this, from the Department.

Figure 3. Location and production values for wells in North Dakota (Department of Mineral Resources )

It is this illustration of the relatively heavy drilling already in the “sweet spots” and the poorer performance in the less well drilled regions that gives me concern for the longer term prospects for the formations. And as an aside note that crude from Alaska is declining, July output was 498 kbd against the year-to-date average of 542 kbd. The EIA is noting that, since there aren’t any major oil pipelines running into California from the East, that there is an increase in rail traffic to make up the difference. The EIA is suggesting that the traffic is already at a level of around 100 kbd.

And this in happening in the most promising region to increase production (though it includes Canada, for which OPEC projects a growth over the year of around 40 kbd, which is set against Mexican production, for which OPEC sees a decline of around 60 kbd).

Malaysia is projected to increase production by 50 kbd, from the Gumusut field. This is a Deepwater project, and one can get some estimate of the shape of the field from the well pattern. The production gain is viewed by OPEC as likely being the highest in the region.

Figure 4. Planned Well pattern for the GUMUSUT KAKAP project in Malaysia (Rawingbadi)

In Latin America Colombia is expected to increase production by 80 kbd, though the country is having some issues with pipe damage from terrorism. There have been more than 30 attacks this year. OPEC also looks for an increase in Brazilian production of 10 kbd over the year, this gain coming after some 14 months of decline, which drop hopefully will be recovered before the end of the year.

Oman will grow production by 20 kbd, but it is in Sudan and Southern Sudan that OPEC anticipates the greatest growth, of 90 kbd. However the two countries are not the best of friends, with oil from Southern Sudan having to ship by pipeline to Sudan, for shipment onwards. At present oil, at an average rate of 75 kbd is continuing to flow up the pipe, but Sudan continues to threaten to halt shipments, leading Southern Sudan, in turn, to plan to shut-in the wells. The OPEC projection seems to be best defined therefore as “iffy.”

OPEC expect Russia to increase production by 80 kbd in 2013, yet there is some caution in that estimate, with other numbers suggesting that Russia is reaching a modern peak in production. Kazakhstan is projected to increase production by 50 kbd (coming from the startup of Kashagan, now expected at the end of September). The 100 kbd production will more than offset declines in the rest of the country. And China may increase production over the year by 60 kbd.

I have listed the countries that OPEC anticipates will grow production by more than 10 kbd, and have not listed the many countries that will see production decline by more than that amount. It is remarkable that listing the increases in production outside of OPEC can be done with just a few paragraphs. And it is a little disturbing that the threats to pipeline security throw questions over the reliability of some of the numbers. And yet this only addresses the possible growth in production, declining producers would require a much longer list. Combined it becomes a little more difficult, as turmoil in MENA continues to grow, to remain optimistic over the OPEC projections.

OGPSS - A June TWIP, and the OPEC MOMR

The EIA has noted, in This Week in Petroleum that, for the first time, the sum of Non-OECD country demand contributed more than half to the total of liquid fuels consumed in the world.

Figure 1. Changes in the relative shares of liquid fuel consumption between the countries in and out of the OECD. (EIA )

It does, however, point out that the projections of the Short Term Energy Outlook are for the two curves to re-intersect at the end of 2014.

Figure 2. Projected changes in liquid fuels consumption, through 2014 (EIA)

The reality of that second assumption is, I rather suspect, more based on hope than reality. Once you start providing power, and all its benefits, to the general population you are on a slippery slope that it is almost impossible to back away from. Consider (as a small example) the problems that Egypt is currently having with the supply of subsidized bread to the general populace. Once you start supplying a commodity at a subsidized price it becomes very hard to change the equation, and too much of the non-OECD world is now living in an economy where energy use is subsidized. The problem that the above graph fails to recognize is that you cannot wean a culture from subsidies in the immediate short term and still expect their government to survive in its present condition.

Thus when the EIA project that global demand will grow to over 92 mbd in the next year, they are likely only being realistic. Their assumption that it may then decline is perhaps more in the nature of wishful thinking.

Figure 3. EIA anticipated growth in demand and supply over the near term (EIA)

There are however a couple of caveats to that last statement, the first of which is that the decline in demand may be more reflective of a lack of supply capacity (our raison d'être) and alternatively it may reflect, as a result of the first, that prices will rise to influence demand. Nevertheless we remain in a condition where the harsh realities that lie just over the horizon remain obfuscated by other events.

As with many other international agencies the EIA continue to anticipate continued growth in the North American supply of liquid fuels. Outside of that growth the increased demand for more than an additional mbd of liquid fuels seems more likely to be likely to be desperately hunting for an invisible savior.

Figure 4. Anticipated growth in liquid fuels supply over the next two years (EIA)

The decline in supply from OPEC in the two years ahead should be noted. It should also be remembered that this is likely to be as much a voluntary control, to ensure price stability in the face of increased North American production, rather than as a result of a short-term supply shortage. However the reality of continued domestic growth in demand in the Middle East, as Westexas has reminded us, is something that cannot be neglected. It has been noted that Saudi Arabia, although having less than a third of Germany’s population, recently surpassed it in terms of oil consumption. It will add several new oil-fired power stations including those at Yanbu and Jeddah. This will feed into an anticipated continued growth in Saudi domestic demand of 5.1% pa.

And this brings us to the OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR) for June. OPEC continues to anticipate a global demand growth of 0.8 mbd this year, though they note that there will likely be a growth of 1.2 mbd in the non-OECD nations, requiring a reduction in OECD demand to match the overall forecast. Major growth in demand will continue to be in China (at 0.4 mbd and the Middle East at 0.3 mbd). On the other hand OPEC anticipate cutting their supply (to match anticipated need) by 0.4 mbd over the course of this year. OPEC, therefore, has slightly dropped their projection for year end, however it will still crest above 90 mbd.

Figure 5. Estimates of global oil demand (OPEC June 2013 MOMR)

A large part of demand projection is tied to growth in the global and individual nation economies, and that is a murky crystal ball to view. But OPEC anticipates that these economies will continue to grow at an increasing rate, while recognizing that this projection is in an area with a high level of risk in the estimate. The continued, and perhaps growing unrest in the Middle East continues to cast a further shadow over predictions over both supply and the reality of future demand in those countries. And, as one of the less frequently discussed topics, future output from Russia is not as assured as the average analyst appears to assume.

OPEC is anticipating a relatively strong growth in demand in the second half of the year to almost reach 91 mbd by the end of the year. Overall the growth in supply to meet this demand continues to come from North America.

Figure 6. Anticipated oil supply for 2013. (OPEC June 2013 MOMR)

OPEC itself is reporting a slight increase in overall production (by about 128 kbd) although, as always, there are differences in the numbers between those supplied by the countries themselves, and those reported from other sources.

Figure 7. OPEC crude oil production as reported directly (OPEC June 2013 MOMR)

There continues to be a significant disparity between the numbers reported from Iran and Venezuela, for example, when other sources are reported to the tune of around 1.5 mbd roughly. In the short term Iraqi production appears stable.

Figure 8. OPEC crude oil production as reported by others (OPEC June 2013 MOMR)

With the continued global reliance on increased production from North America, and, in turn, that reliance on improved production from tight formations, I would be a little more confident of the future were it not for plots such as this, which I recently found.

Figure 9. Chesapeake typical well decline curve (Eagle Ford Forum)

It is a curve that I rather suspect continues to be optimistic.

OGPSS - OPEC and EIA short term projections

Just this month Saudi Aramco announced that production had begun at their Manifa oilfield, and by July would be supplying up to 500 kbd to the new refinery that is being built at Jamail with the collaboration of Total. The first oil from the refinery is expected to ship in August, and both projects are currently ahead of schedule. Manifa will further increase in production next year, to 900 kbd, with the additional flow going to the Yanbu refinery being built with the collaboration of Sinopec. Both these refineries are designed to take heavy crude, and can also accept oil from the ongoing projects to expand production at Safaniya. Collectively this is said to ensure that the company will be able to achieve a maximum sustainable production of 12 mbd.

The gains in available reserves are required as the current production from Ghawar and the other major fields in the Kingdom continue to decline in production, as was discussed last year. I remain relatively convinced that Saudi Aramco will not increase their crude oil production above 10 mbd, despite the wishes and projections of others that they will end up doing so. By the time that their domestic consumption reaches the point that it lowers exports to a level that would hurt the KSA economy at current prices, the shortages globally will have raised the price sufficiently that the available production at that time will continue to suffice to meet their needs. (This is, however, a projection only for this decade).

This month’s OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report continues to anticipate a significant increase in available crude over the next three years, although this is indirectly recognized through the growth in crude distillation unit (CDU) capacity around the globe in that interval.


Figure 1. Increase in crude distillation capacity by regions in the near term. (OPEC April MOMR.)

Given that the world must increasingly deal with a heavier crude supply, the need for new refineries, as exemplified by the new Saudi construction, is evident. Increased demand to absorb this supply will come, in part, by an increase in the growth rate of the GDP of the BRIC nations, although the poor growth in the developed nations continues to hamper their export markets.

Overall demand is still anticipated to increase by around 0.8 mbd, with half of that coming from China and the rest of the non-OECD nations contributing an additional 0.7 mbd, offset by a decline in demand from the OECD nations of around 0.3 mbd, taking global demand, by the end of the year to nearly 91 mbd. Internal demand in the Middle East will continue to sap a fraction of this relative to exports. Overall the Middle East demand is anticipated to increase by 280 kbd, though the impact of the turbulence in various nations is hard to estimate.


Figure 2. OPEC estimate of global demand for 2013. (OPEC April MOMR.)

Virtually all the growth in supply is anticipated to come from North America, with a slight increase in production from South America coming from Colombia and Brazil. There is some concern, however, over the impact of attacks on the energy structure in Colombia.


Figure 3. Anticipated regional change in supply in 2013. (OPEC April MOMR.)

For the US the OPEC report has the following projection:

The expected growth in 2013 is supported by the anticipated supply increase from shale oil plays in North Dakota and Texas, as well as by minor growth from other areas in Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado and Wyoming. The infrastructure situation is improving in North Dakota, with reports suggesting that the railroad loading capacity will reach 1 mb/d. Eagle Ford oil production in January continued to increase from the same period a year earlier. On a quarterly basis, US supply is expected to average 10.57 mb/d, 10.62 mb/d, 10.56 mb/d and 10.55 mb/d respectively.

Canada is expected to reach a production total of 4 mbd by the end of the year, with the largest impact coming from the Kearl Oil Sands production anticipated to bring 110 kbd to market in the third quarter. (This is not dependent on the Keystone pipeline.) Mexico will see a slight decline in production though the Kambesah field (at 13.7 kbd) and increased production from Tsimin will offset most of that.

OPEC is anticipating that Norwegian production will fall 110 kbd this year, with a small decline of 40 kbd in UK production. OPEC expects that Russian production will increase to average 10.43 mbd in 2013, slightly down from first quarter numbers, while, in anticipation of Kashagan production, OPEC expects Kazakhstan to increase production to 1.67 mbd. The decline in production from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field is expected to cause a slight ( 50 kbd) reduction in Azerbaijan production. There is, as previously, some difference between the production that the individual nations of OPEC report each month and that reported by secondary sources.


Figure 4. OPEC crude production from secondary sources.(OPEC April MOMR.)


Figure 5. OPEC crude production based on national direct reporting.(OPEC April MOMR.)

In short, over the course of this year OPEC remains relatively complacent that North American production gains will continue to meet the global demand, and that OPEC (i.e. largely the KSA) can back away from full production in order to balance supply and demand at a price level that keeps the OPEC bankers happy.

Back in March the EIA TWIP noted the change over the years, not only in amounts, but also in the sources of US imports, which remain significant. There has been quite a bit of change since 2005, when imports were at their highest level (10.1 mbd).


Figure 6. Change in the countries and volumes for the ten largest suppliers of crude to the USA. (EIA )

The EIA anticipates that US liquid fuels consumption will remain sensibly stable through the end of 2014, ending that year at 18.61 mbd. At this time production is expected to rise to 11.75 mbd.


Figure 7. EIA estimates of US liquid fuels production through 2014. ( EIA)

In that interval they anticipate that the price of gasoline in the United States will slowly decline. In contrast with the reports by the major oil companies that were discussed recently, these forecasts are short enough that it will be fairly quickly evident how accurate they are.

OGPSS - The BP look into the future

So I suspect I should apologize. Here I am talking about the future projections for energy production that have been made by companies such as ExxonMobil and Shell, as though they were still the key and only players in the world. Yet, in reality, Saudi Aramco (12.5 mbdoe); Gazprom (9.7 mbdoe) and National Iranian Oil (6.4 mbdoe); appear in the list before ExxonMobil arrives (at 5.3 mbdoe), and then there is PetroChina (at 4.4 mbdoe) before BP arrives (at 4.1 mbdoe) and it is only then that we find Shell, which lies 7th at 3.9 mbdoe.

So the projections of the ExxonMobil’s of the world are of somewhat lesser value than they might, at one time, have been. (For those curious the list continues with Pemex (at 3.6 mbdoe); Chevron (at 3.5 mbdoe) and Kuwait Petroleum Co (3.2 mbdoe). This not only rounds out the top ten, it also closes out the list of those producing more than 3 mbdoe. (Abu Dhabi comes next at 2.9 mbdoe).

Yet, with those caveats, and recognizing that Saudi Arabia now produces only slightly less than ExxonMobil, Shell and BP combined, let me review the BP forecast, having already completed that for ExxonMobil and Shell. And while the latter two looked sufficiently far into the future as to obfuscate a little their shorter-term projections, BP is still focusing on the relatively short-term that runs to 2030.

Within that time frame BP expects overall energy demand to grow by 36%, though, as with the ExxonMobil projection, BP expects that a “tremendous increase” in energy efficiency will continue to develop, thereby slowing the need for future resources. They point out that, without this improvement in efficiency, global energy supply will need to double by 2030 in order to sustain economic growth.

This is particularly true for the United States, which BP sees approaching self-sufficiency in Energy, while it is the continued growth in demand from countries such as China and India and the Asian Pacific countries that provide most of additional need. Comparing their view from 2 years ago with the present there does not appear to be much change in the overall forecast. (Note that after the first two figures all the remainder come from the 2030 BP Energy Outlook).


Figure 1. Comparison of BP data and projections for population growth between their 2011 report (left) and that for 2013 (right)


Figure 2. Comparison of current and anticipated energy demand through 2030, from 2011 (left) and 2013 (right) BP reports.

There is a small increase in the overall demand from non-OECD countries in the more recent projection, but not a great difference. But this increase in demand reduces from a growth averaging 2.1% in the 2010-2020 time frame, to a growth of 1.3% in the following decade.

Within the period to 2030 BP anticipates that all major energy sources will continue to see an increase in overall energy production.

The fastest growing fuels are renewables (including biofuels) with growth averaging 7.6% p.a. 2011-30. Nuclear (2.6% p.a.) and hydro (2.0% p.a.) both grow faster than total energy. Among fossil fuels, gas grows the fastest (2.0% p.a.), followed by coal (1.2% p.a.), and oil (0.8% p.a.).

Figure 3. Growth in different energy sources through 2030

However, there is a change in the ranking of the different fossil fuels from the earlier projection. For while, two years ago, BP were projecting that coal, oil and natural gas would virtually tie in terms of market share by 2030, coal is now given a more dominant role, with natural gas falling below oil.


Figure 4. Change in market share for the different energy sources.

Coal is, within this time frame, not really bounded by available supply, though BP anticipate that more will be produced indigenously in the Asian Pacific than at present. Partly one assumes that this is necessary for financial reasons, although it will also be a need-based growth as the countries increasingly need electric power.

In terms of natural gas and oil supply questions are more urgent, and BP provide the following answer.


Figure 5. BP anticipated sources for the anticipated growth in demand for energy.

By far the largest production from the tight oil and gas shales will come from North America, where the current growth in production is anticipated to continue.


Figure 6. Anticipated production of tight oil and shale gas by region in 2030

One of the drivers that BP see, in the fall in oil demand, comes from its continued high price. This has already significantly lowered the use of oil as a power generating fuel, and the continued high price will drive the move to vehicles of increasingly greater efficiency. Thus, although global liquid fuel demand will continue to grow, it will only be at the rate of 0.8% pa, reaching 104 mbd by 2030. The sources to meet this are various:


Figure 7. Liquid fuel supplies through 2030

With the conventional supply of crude from non-OPEC countries diminishing, OPEC crude levels can be seen to increase over the next seventeen years, while the major increase in production from tight oils is anticipated to come from North America. In 2030 it will provide 9% of overall demand, providing almost half of the 16.1 mbd of overall increase in production. The increase will, however, slow post 2020, as the costs of production and the limits of the resource base. BP make the following prediction:

The US will likely surpass Russia and Saudi Arabia in 2013 as the largest liquids producer in the world (crude and biofuels) due to tight oil and biofuels growth, but also due to expected OPEC production cuts. Russia will likely pass Saudi Arabia for the second slot in 2013 and hold that until 2023. Saudi Arabia regains the top oil producer slot by 2027.

Other than tight oil, BP anticipates some increase in biofuel production, and from the oil sands, with significant increase in Iraqi production, and some gain from the remaining OPEC countries (one suspects Venezuela is included here) and from NGL production.

The largest increments of non-OPEC supply will come from the US (4.5 Mb/d), Canada (2.9 Mb/d), and Brazil (2.7 Mb/d), which offset declines in mature provinces such as Mexico and the North Sea. The largest increments of new OPEC supply will come from NGLs (2.5 Mb/d) and crude oil in Iraq (2.8 Mb/d).

In this regard BP believes that currently OPEC has a spare capacity of around 6 mbd, but will continue to cut production to sustain prices over the decade.

BP see roughly a 7% p.a. increase in shale gas production with most coming from the United States, Mexico and Canada. This will bring total natural gas production to 459 bcf/day by 2030. Of this North America will see a growth in production of 5.3% pa and by 2030 will be exporting roughly 8 bcf/d. In other countries the biggest growth will be in more conventional natural gas production, coming from the Middle East (31 bcf/d), Africa (15 bcf/d) and Russia (11 bcf/d).

This increase in supply, and the greater use of LNG tankers is likely to keep natural gas prices relatively stable.

OGPSS - Current oil production and the future of Ghawar

(Updated intro)There is a growing impression being given in the discussion of oil and natural gas supplies, that the world is moving into a period where there will soon be such a plentiful sufficiency of crude that the US may consider exporting some of its production. (h/t Leanan). But if one looks behind the headlines, and particularly at the current status of the largest oilfield contributing toward this rosy picture, the Ghawar field in Saudi Arabia, that optimism becomes more evidently built on a very transient set of data that, as this series of posts seeks to show, will not be sustainable for any significant period into the future.

 The three major oil producers (i.e. those producing more than 5 mbd each) are currently seeing surges in production as the world moves to an overall production of 90 mbd. The OPEC June Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR) notes that this has brought Russia to 10.33 mbd in May, some 100 kbd over the same period in 2011; and Saudi Arabia is reported to have averaged 9.917 mbd in May, up 40 kbd over April. The United States is running at 6.236 Mbd of crude (from the EIA TWIP), while importing 9.117 mbd. The MOMR reports US oil supply at 9.66 mbd on average, but counts more than just crude in this value. The gain over the past year is around 600 kbd. It is interesting to note, in regard to OPEC production the continued difference between the volumes that OPEC reports from direct contact with the suppliers, and that when the numbers are obtained from “secondary sources.”
Figure 1. OPEC production from its members, with values provided by them (OPEC June MOMR)

 
Figure 2. OPEC production from information provided by secondary sources (OPEC June MOMR).

 This surge from the majors has, in part, led the EIA to project that oil prices will, for the remainder of the year, remain relatively stable.
 
Figure 3. EIA estimate of crude oil prices going forward over the next eighteen months (EIA TWIP)

 In the short term, and leading into a national election, there is no significant event (short of a hurricane or two) that obviously threatens this projection – though the Iranian situation and the questionable stability of nations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has to remain a concern. But sadly the continued ill health of the global economy, with no evident savior or realistic plan for growth now visible, means that demand – which OPEC projects will still grow 1.17 mbd y-o-y on average this year, may continue to be met.

I have, however, in previous posts, given my reasons for anticipating that the surge in both Russian production and that in the United States are at near peak, and will soon decline. Saudi Arabia’s fall will be less dramatic and a little later, but the combination does not bode well for the international supply in the next presidential term. The big question with Saudi Arabian production has been, to date, more focused on the production from Ghawar, which at 5 mbd has been the rock on which the overall production builds. But that rock is continuously eroding under the long production periods that its different regions have seen. The final major new effort to bring new production on line in the overall field was the effort at Haradh, down in the South tip of the field.

 JoulesBurn has written comprehensively on this region, beginning with the first well that came into production. In 1979, as the late Matt Simmons pointed out in “Twilight in the Desert”, the three northern segments of Ghawar, Ain Dar, Shedgum and North Uthmaniyah were producing 4.2 mbd of the 5.3 mbd total Ghawar output, with South Uthmaniyah producing another 400 kbd. By 2006 North Uthmaniyah was running at a 46% water cut. Joules has taken the historic record for that region of the field and made a short movie presentation included in a post that shows how Uthmaniyah was developed over the years.
 
Figure 4. Single frame from the movie on drill site development in Uthmaniyah, over time (JoulesBurn)

 The sequence of wells, moving inexorably to the crest of the field, shows how the wells had to move as the underlying reservoir became more depleted in oil. Uthmaniyah is the region where the test program to inject carbon dioxide to enhance EOR is under construction, as mentioned earlier, and scheduled for completion in the fourth quarter of 2013. It is worth noting that Aramco are also planning on using more steam injection for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and that plans have just been signed to increase steam production at the Ju’aymah, Shedgum and Uthmaniyah plants, with completion dates in 2014 and 2015.

Figure 5. Sectors of Ghawar with the date of discovery (Afifi )
As one moves south the quality of the reservoir changes, and becomes more difficult to produce. However as Greg Croft has noted the two lower segments of the field Hawiyah and Haradh were developed with horizontal wells, rather than the vertical wells further north in Ghawar. This has overcome some of the geological constraints and the fact that the productivity index drops from around 140 barrels of oil per day/psi to 45 BOPD/psi at Hawiyah, and 31 at Haradh. In 2008 the Hawiyah NGL recovery plant was commissioned, to yield 310 kbd of ethane and NGL. 

 The further development of the lowest segment of Ghawar, down at Haradh, was one of the major projects that Aramco listed as contributing to their ability to produce up to 12.5 mbd. The latest development built on earlier development and because the use of horizontal wells had transitioned into maximum reservoir contact (MRC) designs by the time of Haradh III reduced the anticipated number of wells from 280 verticals to 32 MRC wells.

  

Figure 6. Planned well layout in Haradh III (from Aramco via JoulesBurn) 

 In his initial review of how that developed JoulesBurn showed how the wells were developed and laid out and explained how he was able to use satellite images to determine the different components of the production equipment. It is relevant to note that Joules updated his view of the region in 2010 when he noted that, after looking at the satellite images of the region, he was able to show that instead of the production coming from the original 32 wells, there were actually some 52 production wells connected up, which – as he noted – raise a few questions as to the actual performance of the wells over the original projections. 

 Aramco have reported, however (pdf) using Real-Time Reserve Management, that it had by the summer of 2009, been more successful than anticipated. Some of the additional wells drilled were to allow cross-hole tomography (pdf) to monitor the location of the oil:water front which, as production evolved, did not follow the anticipated path. This was particularly important to establish given the 1 km spacing between wells and the more complex geology relative to that further north in Ghawar. 

 

Figure 7. Schematic showing how cross-hole tomography is carried out (Stephen Prenskey ) 

 

Figure 8. Image from Crosshole tomography at Haradh (out (Stephen Prenskey) 

 What is, however, also clear from looking at the different regions of Ghawar is that there are no places left for new programs to restore production as wells become exhausted. If KSA is to sustain its production it must look beyond the King of Oil Fields, who now lies stricken in years.

OPEC in disagreement, the Saudi dilemma

OPEC Ministers, meeting in Vienna, have apparently had one of their more divisive discussions of recent times over the question of raising pumped volumes.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates wanted an increase to dampen an oil price that has gained 25pc since tensions erupted in the Middle East this spring while Libya, Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Venezuela, Iraq and Iran wanted to keep production unchanged.

The two camps are reported to be so far apart as to threaten the structure of the organization. While the lack of agreement (for the first time in 20 years) officially means that there will be no increase in the quotas of the different countries, Saudi Arabia may, unilaterally, move to increase production in order to meet growing demand and stop the steady increase in price. In the short term, however, the lack of agreement has had the immediate effect of increasing prices.

The proposed increase in volume was 1.5 mbd, which is roughly in agreement with the OPEC projection made through their Monthly Oil Market Reports, of a 1.4 mbd anticipated growth in demand this year. That estimate of demand growth recognized the 0.5 total drop in demand from Japan, though offsetting this with greater growth from China, and anticipating repair of the Japanese refineries. (The next report won’t be out until Friday). Given that we are now in the summer driving season for the largest customers, where demand has normally risen, the move, proposed by Saudi Arabia, would at first sight seem a rational step to keep prices under control.

But given the lack of agreement, the question remains as to whether Saudi Arabia (KSA) and its allies at the OPEC table will increase production in defiance of the rest. Bear in mind that should they have the increase, and prices fall, then those countries that don’t (or can’t) increase production lose money as the price falls. However, if the price rises too much, then the world could be kicked back into recession, and global demand could fall, making everyone lose money on smaller volume.

One has only to look at the latest gas prices in this week’s “This Week in Petroleum” to anticipate how this question over the available supply of crude may well kick the graph back into an upward trend.

US Gas Prices (TWIP )

Demand for gasoline flickered when the price peaked, but then despite the price, and with vacation time beginning, demand has returned to last year’s numbers and may well continue to increase over the next six weeks, following that curve. That depends on how the price changes. Any indication of more oil may hold it at current levels, but without that, as demand grows globally, then without supply to meet it the price will rise until a new balance is reached.

Demand for Gasoline in the USA (TWIP )

But this brings us back to the question as to how great a price increase the world can stand, and concurrently, whether OPEC could sustain a 1.5 mbd increase in production. This really (in terms of a significant step) throws the ball back into Saudi Arabia’s court, since they are the one nation that could provide the increase in volume. And certainly in the short term there are enough wells and fields that could have production increased to give the extra volume.

Life is, however, not that simple. To bring additional complexity to the discussion Goldman Sachs has been suggesting that OPEC production will top out next year, and then begin to dwindle. Since OPEC are sensibly the only folk capable of increasing production significantly to meet growing market demand, that prediction had already roiled the market a little. Non-OPEC production has risen 0.8 mbd in the first quarter, y-o-y, but the gains from the US may be over, at the moment.

US Production of crude (TWIP)

However Saudi Arabia will not over-produce in the short term to hurt the long term production from their fields, thus gains in production in the out years will have to come from new developments. Manifa is the most immediate answer as to where the additional oil will come from, according to the new (2010) Aramco annual review. But with that oil requiring special refineries to process that aren’t anticipated to be available until 2014 for the first, and the second still not finalized, that only gets the increase to 0.4 mbd. There is some additional production that is anticipated from Safaniya, another heavy crude source, but that is directed towards planned refineries at Yanbu and Jazan, but the former is scheduled for 2014, while the latter won’t be ready until 2017. The four new oil fields (Namlan, AsSayd, Arsan and Qamran) that Aramco announced will also take time to develop. As a result the increased production that will come from Saudi Arabia are unlikely to rise much above that available from the recent development of Khurais and Khursaniya, which totals some 1.7 mbd. Some of that new production will concurrently have to offset some of the declining production in older fields

Overall production will be limited to 12 mbd, acknowledged as the maximum sustainable rate for the country, but that number includes domestic use, which is already at 800 kbd and rising.

Unfortunately the 1.5 mbd proposed for the OPEC increase will likely also include any offsetting increased production to compensate for countries in turmoil in the MENA. So, as none of those countries is looking as though stability has yet been conclusively re-established, the combined picture was not really looking that good before we got the news from Vienna.

OGPSS - The Railroad Commission of Texas

This post originally went up last week, and in some wonder of modern technology was wiped out by Blogger, along with a lot of other posts which had gone up at about the same time. We were promised that it would be put back, it has not been. So here, as best as I can reconstruct it, is the post. My apologies for the delay and possible confusion.

When I have written about oil and natural gas production from individual wells, in previous posts, I have referred to the website of the Texas Railroad Commission as the source of my information. You might wonder why they are in charge. Well it all began back in the days after Texas first became a State, and the government wanted to encourage folk to move out into the state. Historically railroads had been built to connect existing towns and cities, but there weren’t any going West. And so, to encourage railroads to grow out west they were allowed land grants and a number of tax and other grants and incentives that would encourage rail, and the growth of towns along the track, as a result.

Now since this provided a sensible monopoly on transportation, the Texas legislature, as far back as 1853, had enacted comprehensive laws regarding the railroads. The problem was that they were not enforced, and for a number of years the railroads could charge as much as the traffic would bear. This led to many protests, particularly from farmers, and after many promises, in 1891 the Railroad Commission of Texas (RRC) was created:

An Act to establish a Railroad Commission for the State of Texas whereby discrimination and extortion in railroad charges may be prevented, and reasonable freight and passenger tariffs may be established; to prescribe and authorize the making of rules and regulations to govern the Commission and the railroads, and afford railroad companies and other parties adequate remedies; to prescribe penalties for the violation of this act and provide means and rules for its enforcement.

That created the RRC, and after some struggles, and a trip to the Supreme Court it succeeded in establishing that it had the power, which it enforced, to cut shipping rates. But how did that allow it to get into controlling the “oil bidniss”?

The simple part of the answer is that when the Commission was set up, its responsibilities included:

Determination of passenger fares, freight rates, and charges for all classes of common carriers in Texas.

As the boom in oil production began in Texas, production rates were initially high and, as I noted last time, many wells were being drilled in close proximity, with incentives (including the “right of capture”) that drove owners to produce their wells as fast as possible. And in 1931 an average of 8 wells a day was being drilled in Texas.

The result was a glut of oil on the market with prices falling from $1.10 before the Daisy Bradford #3 well was drilled (By H.L. Hunt) to $0.15 and even $0.02 a barrel on the spot market. (The Big Rich by Bryan Burrough ) Someone had to do something, and the choice pointed to “proration”. In this each well could be assigned a certain production or number of days in the month that it could produce, based on the number of wells and the amount of oil that the market was considered able to bear. But who should set the quantities.

Oil, once it is out of the ground, has to be transported and the early alternatives were either by rail car or pipeline. The rail roads were already under the RRC and in 1917 the Texas Legislature designated pipelines as “common carriers” which also brought them under the RRC. By 1919 this oversight was extended to include jurisdiction over Oil and Gas. And a new Division was born. (The agency continued to have some role in railroads until 2005, when that was completely phased out).

The RRC had unsuccessfully tried to control production earlier, and in 1931 it tried again, setting a proration order for the East Texas field of 160,000 bd at a time when it was producing half-a-million barrels. That didn’t go anywere either, but the impact on the economies of the states was becoming too great. It was the larger companies that largely argued for proration

Jacob Wolters of the Texas Company (Texaco), warned of the ruin of thousands of wells, as well as “the bankruptcy of producers, the loss of millions of dollars in revenues of the State, and the consequent increase of taxes on other sources in order that the public schools, higher institutions of learning, eleemosynary institutions and the departments of the State may continue to function.”

Up in Oklahoma City the city council had passed a law that restricted oil wells to one per city block, and their attempt to close wells was so challenged that the Okahoma Governor, William Murray, declared martial law and closed the wells, initially for a day. This in turn led him to place the 3,106 oil producing wells in Oklahoma under martial law from August 4, 1931 until April 1933.

Down in Texas, as Bryan Burroughs notes, H.L. Hunt and other large producers urged the Texas Governor to follow suit.

On August 16, declaring East Texas oilmen to be in open “rebellion” agaist the site, he declared martial law and sent in the National Guard to shut down the oil field.

It was re-opened three weeks later, but with individual wells limited to only producing 225 bd. As these controls began to limit production in the face of growing demand so the price stabilized and slowly began to creep up. By 1933 it had reached $0.99 before falling again. A “hot oil” market was making it too lucrative to flout the law and smuggle oil, and this led to the “hot oil wars.”

To enforce the proration limits the Texas Legislature began to pass tighter and tighter regulations giving the Railroad Commission greater powers. Further the governments of Kansas, New Mexico, Texas and Oklahoma got together to establish a common approach, out of which came the Interstate Oil Compact in 1936. At the same time the Federal Government passed the Connally Hot Oil Act giving it the power to enforce the directives of the Texas RRC in interstate commerce. The regulation of output was considered as one of the steps in increasing the estimated reserves of the East Texas field from one to five billion barrels.

From 1936 until 1972, with the exception of the War years, the RRC controlled production though proration. In this way, when the Iranian revolution in 1951 nationalized the oilfields there, Texas was able to increase production and fill the gap. It was able to do the same during the Suez Canal crisis in 1958. And then, as foreign oil became a glut on the market, the RRC cut production from the wells, down to only seven days a month in 1962. But production over time was depleting the fields. When the Arab-Israeli war broke out in 1967 production could not be brought high enough to meet demand, and in 1972 the RRC set the proration at 100%. The result was only a limited gain in volume, for American oil production had peaked. And Texas had taught the rest of the world’s oil producers a lesson, for OPEC was aborning.

The commission still monitors well production, and is a site where this information is available. The site notes that both oil and gas production and oil well completions this year are running behind last years numbers.